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5This thesis deals with the efficient algorithms and implementations on circular pat-
tern matching along with the web tools and relevant security in practical perspective.
The contribution has been attributed by developing efficient algorithms and imple-
menting web based tool as an application on circular pattern matching. Extensive
experiments on circular pattern matching has been conducted in traditional desktop
based programming environment. The experimental results have been found to be
excellent. An web based software tool on circular pattern matching has also been im-
plemented. While developing the web based tool, the research progressed to the area
of web security and vulnerability in some extent. The thesis addressed that web based
security issues by providing the solutions in both algorithmic and practical perspec-
tive.
An introduction of this thesis has been presented in Chapter 1. This chapter gives
an overview and brief literature review of the problems those have been addressed
in the thesis. The algorithms and implementations on exact circular string matching
has been presented in Chapter 2. Approximate circular string matching is a practical
variation of circular pattern matching. The algorithms, implementations and experi-
mental results on approximate circular string matching has been presented in Chapter
3. Circular string matching research on biological perspective is very new, so there is
a lack of web based efficient tool for the biologists on circular string matching. The
web based tool has been developed and presented in Chapter 4. Web based tool at-
tracts inherent Internet security and vulnerability. The known vulnerability issue in
development perspective has been presented in Chapter 5. Circular pattern matching
algorithms have been applied to solve One to Many fingerprint problems in Chap-
ter 6 by adapting the algorithms in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. The further extension
in the area of web security has been done in Chapter 7 which deals with the URL in
Steganography.
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This chapter provides a brief introduction to the content of this thesis. I have de-
veloped efficient algorithms and implemented web based tools on circular pattern
matching. While developing these tools, my research progressed to the area of web
security and vulnerability in some extent. I have addressed those security issues by
providing the solutions from both algorithmic and practical perspectives. I presented
my algorithms and implementations on Exact Circular Pattern matching in Chapter
2 and Approximate circular pattern matching in Chapter 3. Circular string match-
ing research on biological perspective is very new, so there is a lack of efficient web
based tools for biologists to solve circular string matching problem. I have developed
and presented my web based tool on Chapter 4. Web based tools introduce inherent
security and vulnerability issues. I addressed the known vulnerability issues from a
development perspective in Chapter 5. I have applied circular pattern matching al-
gorithms and solved One to Many fingerprint problems in Chapter 6. I have further
extended my work in the area of web security in Chapter 7
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Chapter 1. Introduction 15
1.1 Circular pattern matching
1.1.1 Overview
The circular pattern, denoted by C(P), corresponding to a given patternP = P1 . . .Pm,
is formed by connecting P1 with Pm and forming a cycle. This gives us the notion
where the same circular pattern can be seen as m different linear patterns, which
would all be considered equivalent. In the Circular Pattern Matching (CPM) prob-
lem, one is interested in pattern matching between the text T and the circular pattern
C(P) of a given pattern P . This views C(P) as a set of m patterns starting at positions
j ∈ [1 : m] and wrapping around the end. In other words, in CPM, I search for all
rotations of a given pattern in a given text. While CPM itself is a variant of the clas-
sic pattern matching problem, further useful variations are possible. The requirement
of approximation or allowing errors in CPM is also important and is natural because
of the possibility of error in data. Instead of locating exact occurrences of all the rota-
tions, approximation allows a threshold of errors within each occurrence. This natural
extension gives us the approximate circular pattern matching (ACPM) problem which
is more interesting and challenging.
In Chapter 2 I present a fast algorithm for the exact circular pattern matching prob-
lem based on some filtering techniques. In Chapter 3 I present a fast algorithm for the
approximate circular pattern matching. In particular, I employ a number of simple
and effective filters to preprocess the given pattern and the text. After this prepro-
cessing, I get a text of reduced length on which I can apply existing state of the art
algorithms to get the occurrences. I have done experimental studies to compare our
algorithm with the state of the art algorithms and the results are found to be excel-
lent. The algorithm turns out to be much faster in practice because of the huge reduc-
tion in the search space through filtering. Also, the filtering technique is simple and
lightweight.
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1.1.2 Brief literature review
Perhaps the first attempt to solve the problem of circular pattern matching has been
documented in [6], where anO(n)-time algorithm is presented. A naive solution with
quadratic complexity would be to apply a classical algorithm for searching a finite set
of strings on the trie of rotations of P after constructing it. The approach presented
in [6] preprocesses P by constructing a suffix automaton of the string PP , because,
every rotation of P is a factor of PP . Then, by feeding T into the automaton, the
lengths of the longest factors of PP occurring in T can be found by the links followed
in the automaton in time O(n). In [7], an optimal average-case algorithm for CPM
has been presented. In particular, here the authors have shown that the average-case
lower bound for the (linear) pattern matching of O(n logσm/m) also holds for CPM,
where σ = |Σ|. Recently, Chen et al. [8] have exploited word-level parallelism to
present two fast average-case algorithms. Very recently, I and my coauthors have
presented a filter-based approach to solve the problem in [9] and [10]. Our approach
in [10, 9] turns out to be highly effective in practice. In fact, as it will be clear shortly,
this thesis extends our approach of [10, 9] to solve the approximate version of the
problem. Notably, a preliminary version of our work has been presented at [11]. The
further works has been published on the journal [12].
To the best of my knowledge, the approximate version of the problem has not re-
ceived much attention in the literature until it has been studied in [4] very recently. In
[4], Barton et al. have first presented an efficient algorithm for CPM, i.e., for the exact
version of the problem which runs in O(n) time on average. Based on the above, they
have subsequently devised fast average-case algorithms (ACSMF-Simple) for ACPM,
i.e., approximate circular string matching allowing k-mismatches. They have built a
library for ACSMF-Simple algorithm that is freely available at [13].
Indexing circular patterns [14] and variations of circular string matching under the
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edit distance model [15] have also been considered in the literature. Apart from be-
ing interesting from a purely combinatorial point view, CPM has applications in areas
such as geometry, astronomy and computational biology. Circular patterns occur in
the DNA of viruses [16, 17], bacteria [18], eukaryotic cells [19], and archaea [20]. As
a result, as has been noted in [21], algorithms on circular strings seem to be impor-
tant in the analysis of organisms with such structure. Circular strings have previously
been studied in the context of sequence alignment. In [22], basic algorithms for pair-
wise and multiple circular sequence alignment have been presented. These results
have later been improved in [23], where an additional preprocessing stage is added
to speed up the execution time of the algorithm. In [24], the authors also have pre-
sented efficient algorithms for finding the optimal alignment and consensus sequence
of circular sequences under the Hamming distance metric. For further details on the
motivation and applications of this problem in computational biology and other areas
the readers are referred to [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24] and references therein.
1.1.3 Preliminaries
Let Σ be a finite alphabet. An element of Σ∗ is called a string. The length of a string w is
denoted by |w|. The empty string  is a string of length 0, that is, || = 0. Let Σ+ = Σ∗−
{}. For a string w = xyz, where x, y and z are called a prefix, factor (or equivalently,
substring), and suffix of w, respectively. The i-th character of a string w is denoted by
w[i] for 1 ≤ i ≤ |w|, and the factor of a string w that begins at position i and ends at
position j is denoted by w[i : j] for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ |w|. For convenience, let us assume
w[i : j] =  if j < i. Let k-factor is a factor of length k.
A circular string of length m can be viewed as a traditional linear string which has
the left-most and right-most symbols wrapped around and stuck together. Under this
notion, the same circular string can be seen as m different linear strings, which would
all be considered equivalent. Given a string P of length m, denoted by P i = P[i :
m]P[1 : i− 1], 0 < i < m, the i-th rotation of P and P0 = P .
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Example 1 Suppose I have a pattern P = atcgatg. The pattern P has the following rota-
tions (i.e., conjugates): P1 = tcgatga,P2 = cgatgat,P3 = gatgatc,P4 = atgatcg,P5 =
tgatcga,P6 = gatcgat.
The Hamming distance between strings P and T , both of length n, is the number
of positions i, 0 ≤ i < n, such that P[i] 6= T [i]. Given a non-negative integer k, let
us write P ≡k T or equivalently say that P k-matches T , if the Hamming distance
between P and T is at most k. In biology, the Hamming distance is popularly referred
to as the Mutation distance. A little mutation could be considered and in fact antici-
pated while finding the occurrences of a particular (circular) virus in a carrier’s DNA
sequence. This scenario in fact refers to approximate circular pattern matching (ACPM).
If, k = 0, then I get the exact CPM, i.e., mutations are not considered. Note that in
this setting, ACPM also returns all the occurrences returned by CPM; it computes the
occurrences allowing up to k mismatches/mutations.
I consider the DNA alphabet, i.e., Σ = {a, c, g, t}. In my approach, each char-
acter of the alphabet is associated to a numeric value as follows. Each character is
assigned a unique numbers from the range [1...|Σ|]. Although this is not essential,
I conveniently assign the numbers from the range [1...|Σ|] to the characters of Σ fol-
lowing their inherent lexicographical order. Let us use num(x), x ∈ Σ to denote the
numeric value of the character x. So, I have num(a) = 1, num(c) = 2, num(g) = 3 and
num(t) = 4,. For a string S, I use the notation SN to denote the numeric representa-
tion of the string S; and SN [i] denotes the numeric value of the character S[i]. So, if
S[i] = g then SN [i] = num(g) = 3. The concept of circular string and their rotations
also apply naturally on their numeric representations.
Example 2 Suppose I have a pattern P = atcgatg. The numeric representation of P is
PN = 1423143. And this numeric representation has the following rotations: P1N = 4231431,
P2N = 2314314, P3N = 3143142, P4N = 1431423, P5N = 4314231, P6N = 3142314.
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1.2 Circular pattern matching for fingerprint identification
1.2.1 Overview
Fingerprints are used in many fields for several purposes. A typical fingerprints sys-
tems database may consists of millions of fingerprints template. Accordingly, improv-
ing matching performance with large database has been taken under consideration in
the recent research. In this work, I proposed an efficient database indexing technique
using 4 fast and lightweight filters. The approach reduces the number of nominated
fingerprints before matching stage by applying the 4 filters on the database gradually.
The introduced algorithm is robust and fast which is done in linear time regarding the
fingerprints rotation.
Automated Fingerprint Recognition Systems (AFRS) usually deployed in two modes
(verification and identification). Furthermore, these systems can be found in many
applications such as managing the employees attendance, border control in airports,
access control to sensitive data and so on. The verification recognition mode is a one to
one matching procedure that matches the scanned fingerprint to the same registered
fingerprint in the database [25]. On the other hand, identification recognition mode is
a one to many matching procedure that identify only a number of fingerprints from
which are saved in the database and matches the scanned fingerprint [25]. In Identifi-
cation recognition mode, the database might contain a large volume of data due to the
system requirements. For instance, the immigration systems at the airports deal with
millions of saved fingerprints. The most popular technique is indexing the fingerprint
database to adopt a subset of nominated fingerprints.
There are two main classes in fingerprints indexing: the first class uses features
called ridge orientation map and ridge frequency map [26], [27] whereas, the second
class uses feature called minutiae. Generally, the first class is faster than the second
one since it stores the feature in compact vectors. On the other hand, the second class
is more accurate since the minutiae consists more distinguishable information of the
Chapter 1. Introduction 20
fingerprints than ridge orientation and frequency maps.
Combining both indexing approaches have been used to improve the performance
regarding speed and accuracy at [28], [29]. Keeping in mind, the matching process
speed can be affected by the accuracy level. Achieving higher accuracy may result in
slowing the matching process [25], [30].
1.2.2 Brief literature review
Human fingerprints can be represented as composite of ridges and grooves on the
fingertip skin. The human fingertip skin consists of ridges and furrows, these two
combination form a sophisticated pattern by running the ridges and furrows in paral-
lel lines and curves. The paper [31] mentioned three main fingerprint patterns called
whorl, loop and arch. Henry’s fingerprint classification system classified the finger-
prints into eight classes: Plain Arch, Tented Arch, Left Slant Loop, Right Slant Loop,
Plain Whorl, Double-Loop Whorl, Central-Pocket Whorl, and Accidental Whorl [32],
[33].
Every fingerprint is highly immutable and unique, this uniqueness is defined by
minutiae which can be explained as the combinations of local features such as ridge
endings and ridge bifurcations, global features such as ridges and valleys. [34].
In fact, there is an old tool for identifying people, adopting the so-called ink-
technique [25]. This technique defined through dabbing the fingers with ink to print
the fingerprints on paper which later scanned to be a digital fingerprints. This is called
off-line fingerprints approach that matches fingerprints by utilising the archived dig-
ital images. Despite the importance of the above technique in forensics field, it is not
applicable for biometrics applications [35] which need real time solutions.
When it comes to solving the fingerprints identification problem in large databases,
fingerprint indexing and fingerprint classification have been the most reliable solu-
tions until now [36]. Henry classifications system [37] classified the fingerprints into
five categories: left loop, right loop, whorl, arch, and tented arch. Nevertheless, these
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number of categories are relativity small comparing to the number of the fingerprints
in the databases. To explain, fingerprints indexing is to represent the fingerprints with
feature vectors. This approach is deployed during the matching stage where a query
fingerprint will be matched with the fingerprints in database which their vectors are
similar to query vector [36]. Various algorithms have been proposed to improve fin-
gerprints indexing which involve either global feature or minutiae feature.
1.2.3 Minutia feature
The main concept is to construct a robust and discriminant minutia with rotation and
translation problems. In [38] and [39] the proposed algorithms are based on features
of triangle or quadrangle geometry and selected simple hashing methods. However,
these geometric characteristic has more sensitivity to distortion and noise. Whereas,
the author of [40] designed a descriptor used a minutiae triplet. The features of triplet
consists of the angles, the length and the ridge to be calculated between each minutiae
pair. A false rate might be happening due to that the minutia is superior in discrimi-
nation. A pairwise enrolment is used to reduce the false rate between each input fin-
gerprint and the stored fingerprints in the database using clustering transformation
parameter which costs a lot of time.
Later, [38] developed the algorithm in [40] to increase the matching accuracy and
the speed. They used a new minutiae triplets feature and effective ad-hoc geometric
rules on the theory of triplets matching instead of pairwise enrollment. Therefore, an
logarithm has been proposed in [41] to use a binary Minutia Cylinder Code (MCC)
to be a minutia descriptor. This approach is proposed to encode the direction and lo-
cation of neighbour minutiae around per minutia into a bit vector with fixed length.
Although, MCC has higher accuracy and speed but it requires a higher dimension. Al-
ternatively, Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) is utilised to search for MCC hypothesis
correspondences rather than original quantisation strategy.However,it is not efficient
for applications need high accuracy.
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1.2.4 Global feature
The main idea of global feature is ridges information represented by specific points
or orientation domain. In [42] and [43] the authors presented to find out selected
points as features to be used in fingerprints indexing. There are draw backs of this
method which needs fingerprints pre-alignment and there is a challenge to extract
certain points from specified location from distorted image. In [44] and [26], the au-
thors illustrated fingerprint indexing derived from orientation dormant to represents
fingerprint feature vector. The main problem of this method is that the features are
global and they are not able to distinguish the minutiae.
1.2.5 Circular string in fingerprint identification
I am interested in [45] that uses circular pattern matching. I explored the opportunity
of solving one to many fingerprint identification problem by using some lightweight
filters.
My proposed approach and contribution is to save the filter signature of each fin-
gerprint in a database by using a circular string. The details are presented in chapter
6.
1.3 Web tool security
1.3.1 Overview
Most sites in current web spectrum are vulnerable. In fact, 86% of websites contain
at least one ’serious’ vulnerability according to the WhiteHat [46] Report 2015. Web
developers worldwide are trying to provide solutions for user’s functionality require-
ments. In most cases the security issues are not dealt with correctly while developing
the product.
The web security is considered to be an expert area while in true sense the developers
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needs to be aware of this issue during developing the applications. The functionality
of an web application that fulfils the business requirements may have serious level of
vulnerabilities. As a result the web applications becomes vulnerable to different kinds
of attacks.
1.3.2 Brief literature review
I have developed both desktop and web based tool for circular patter matching in
genome perspective. Web tool attracts inherent vulnerability of web. The common
web vulnerabilities to date from software development perspective has been illus-
trated by the CWE/SANS top 25 most dangerous software errors report [47] in which
web application vulnerabilities ranked the top. In addition, the industry scanning
tool[48] gives the insight about the issues. According to the Open Web Application
Security Project (OWASP) the most common web vulnerabilities are(SQL injection,
Cross-site Scripting (XSS), Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), Security Misconfigura-
tion, Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards, No Account Lockout, Insecure Password
Policy and HTTPS not enforced) as presented in their Top Ten Most Critical Web Ap-
plication Security Risks Report in 2013 [49]. In most cases the hackers use these com-
mon vulnerabilities to get access to the system which later turns out to be disastrous
for the organizations [47].
In Chapter 7, I presented the guidelines and solutions based on the understanding
of vulnerabilities found in web tool.
1.4 Web tool for URL Steganography
1.4.1 Overview
Steganography is the science of hiding data within data. Steganography plays role in
either for the good purpose of secret communication or with the intention of leaking
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sensitive and confidential data or embedding malicious code or URL. Many different
carrier file formats can be used to hide these data (network, audio, image etc). The
most common Steganography carrier is embedding secret data within images as it is
considered to be the easiest way to hide all types of files (secret files) within an image
using different formats (another image, text, video, virus ,URL..etc). To the human
eye, the changes in the image appearance with the hidden data can be imperceptible.
In fact, images can be more than what we see with our eyes. Many solutions were
proposed to help in detecting these hidden data but each solution has own strength
and weakness either by the limitation of resolving one type of image along with spe-
cific hiding technique or in extracting the hidden data. My work intends to propose a
novel detection approach that will concentrate on detecting any kind of hidden URL
in the loss-less images and extract the hidden URL from the carrier image using the
LSB (least significant bit) hiding technique.
1.4.2 Brief Literature Review
The word steganography is derived from the Greek words stegos meaning cover and
grafia meaning writing [50]. Steganography and cryptography considered to be com-
plementing each other rather than replacing each other. Cryptography is the art of
scrambling messages to make it difficult to understand, whereas, Steganography is
the art of hiding it to make it difficult to find. Therefore, steganography is an extra
layer to support transferring secret information in a secure way. When steganography
fails and the message can be detected, it is still of no use as it is encrypted using cryp-
tography techniques [51].
Moreover, Steganographic techniques started ages ago back to ancient Greece. Start-
ing by writing text on wax-covered tablets to shaving the head of a messenger and
tattoo a message or image on the messenger’s head, then, the hair will grew back, and
the message will be undetected until the head was shaved again [52].
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Since then, the science of steganography has developed significantly to more sophis-
ticated techniques far more than their ancient predecessors, allowing a user to hide
large amounts of information within image, audio files and even networks. In fact,
in reality the main difference between the modern steganographic techniques and the
previous one is only the form of carrier for the secret information. For instance, in-
stead of using human skin and wooden tables, now it is being used by media files
such as images,audio, video etc.
Although, within the daily discovery of a message hidden with in existing applica-
tion, the new steganographic applications are being devised. The old methods are
given new twists[52]. Therefore, there are many types of steganographic methods to
hide secret data with new carriers, new hiding techniques or new type of secret data.
1.4.3 The concept of steganography
The concept of steganography is to embed data, which is to be hidden. This process
requires three files:
First one is the secret message which is the information to be hidden. As mentioned
before with the new steganography techniques almost any kind of data can be hidden.
Second, is the cover file (carrier) that will hold the hidden information and as well
almost any kind of files can be used as a carrier. Finally, the key file to find the hidden
message and extract it from the cover file, the result of these three files is a file called
(Stego file) as shown in Figure 1.1.
FIGURE 1.1: Stego application Scenario
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The most common steganography technique is embedding messages within im-
ages as its considered to be the best carrier (Cover File) to hide all types of files within
it. For example, hiding (another image, virus, URL, text, exe file , audio..etc) without
changing its visible properties [53].
1.4.4 Steganography applications
Steganography can be used for good intentions in many useful ways for example to
help in transferring secret data, copy rights control of materials and smart IDs where
individuals’ details are embedded in the photograph [54]. It can also be used in
printed images where the data will be embedded before printing and the user can
scan the printed image with a smart device and the embedded information will ap-
pear on the device, that can be useful in so many fields especially exhibitions and as a
marketing tool to display the products information.
Nevertheless, hospitals are using Steganography to keep their patient’s confidential
data such as DNA sequences in a secret safe place where the access to it, is highly
restricted.
Cyber-crime is believed to get benefited from transferring illegal data or embedding
viruses and malicious URLs in carries and other harmful actions. Therefore, due to the
rapid development of steganography methods and techniques, the steganography re-
search area has gained the attention during the last decade.
Besides that, nowadays any person without any technical background can do harm-
ful cyber crime actions with the support of the cyber crime ready made sophisticated
softwares which are available online to everyone with no cost and easy to use [55]
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1.4.5 Image steganography
Images can be more than what we see with our eyes. Using an image as a cover file is
considered to be one of the most useful and cost effective technique [56], all the image
steganographic techniques to hide data based on the structure of the most commonly
used images format on the internet (GIF-graphics interchange format), (PNG-portable
network groups) and (BMP- Bit Map Picture).
• Cover Image: In steganography the original image that was chosen as a carrier
for the secret data is called a cover image.
• Stego Image: Is the result image of choosing the right cover image and embed-
ding the secret data inside it.
• Stego Key: The sender should have an algorithm for creating the stego image to
embed the data, and the receiver should have the matching algorithm to extract
the hidden data from that particular stego image and its called stegokey.
Image Embedding Process : Let C be the chosen Cover Image, and C ′ is the Stego
Image, the Stego Key will be denoted as K, and the hidden message as M then:
C ⊕M ⊕K → C ′
as shown in Figure 1.2.
FIGURE 1.2: Image steganography embedding process [54]
The main challenge in image Steganography is that many image manipulation
techniques might destroy the hidden message on any image because it might change
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the feature of the stego-image. It might as well change the feature of the hidden mes-
sage inside it. For example, cropping might crop the hidden message if it is located
in one section of the image or corrupt it, rotation might give the receiver difficulty in
finding the hidden message, filtering might destroy the hidden message completely
and so on.
1.4.6 Current image steganography techniques
The stego file is generated by embedding the actual image file with the hidden data.
The typical diagram is given here.
FIGURE 1.3: stegocode
Steganography embedding techniques can be divided into two groups. These are
Spatial Domain and Frequency Domain. Spatial Domain embeds directly the secret
data in the intensity of the image pixels usually with the least significant bit (LSB)
in the image. Frequency Domain transforms the images and then the secret data is
embedded in the transformed image [57].
According to the Review on current Methods and application of Digital Image
Steganography 2015, it appears that the Spatial Domain is mostly used by researches
in comparison to frequency domain as shown in Figure 1.4. Yet, there is a lot of scope
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and opportunities to steganalysis and develop more effective methods for steganog-
raphy [56].
FIGURE 1.4: Stego methods
The focus of my work is on spatial domain. In spatial domain, the steganographer
modifies the secret data and the cover image which involves re-encoding the least
significance bits (LSBs) in the carrier image. To the human eye these changes in the
image value of the LSB are imperceptible [58].
1.4.7 Least significant bits
It is the steganography approach of embedding data at the least significant bit (LSB)
in the cover image.
Least Significant Bits (LSB) is considered to be one of the simplest approaches of
embedding data in a cover image. This technique embeds the bits of the secret data
directly into the least significant bit plane of the cover image [54].
On average, a small number of bits in an image will need to be modified to hide
a secret data using the maximal cover size. In fact, the result of these changes are too
small to be recognized by the human visual system (HVS). So the message is effec-
tively hidden [50].
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1.4.8 Steganalysis
Steganalysis is the main step in the steganography detecting technique to discover
the hidden messages. It’s the way of identifying the suspected medium , determine
whether or not they have an embedded data into it, and, if possible, recovering that
data. in other words ’Steganalysis is the science of attacking steganography in a battle
that never ends’ [54].
Stegnalysis can be done in different forms:
1. The Steganography attack is known to the stegnalysis: The cover file, the hid-
den message and the Steganography tool (algorithm) are all known to the ste-
ganlysis, then it should not be difficult to identify and locate the hidden mes-
sage.
2. Only the original file and the Cover file are known to stegnalysis: The mission
will be to compare the two files and identify the hidden message according to
the pattern differences that are detected between the two files.
3. Only the secret message only is known to the stegnalysis: The mission will
be looking for a known pattern in all the files and that may be very difficult to
achieve.
4. Only the cover file is known to the stegnalysis: Similarly to the previous point
it will be challenging to identify the hidden message location since it may be
scattered to more than one place.
The image processing is usually the main technique used in building steganalysis
programs to study different image manipulations such as translation , filtering, crop-
ping and rotation. This is done by examining the cover image structure for first order
statistics (histograms) or second order statistics (correlations between pixels, distance,
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direction). The double compression of JPEG and the distribution of DCT (discrete
cosine transform) coefficients can give hints on the use of DCT-based image steganog-
raphy [54].
1.4.9 URL in image steganography
Embedding data in images is not a new technique. However, improving this method
in image steganography is getting better and more sophisticated. One of the recent
improvements is embedding a URL ( Uniform Resource Locator) in the image least
significant bits. The main reason behind embedding URL in an image instead of the
whole secret data is that the URL occupies much lesser space in the carrier[59] and
that helps hiding the data.
FIGURE 1.5: Stego process
Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat UnitTM published a full analysis in June 2015
where they explained that malware authors are evolving their techniques to evade net-
work and host-based detection mechanisms. stegoloader could represent an emerg-
ing trend in malware by the use of digital image steganography to hide malicious
code.[60]. In previous report [61] Dell warned about Lurk Downloader where the
malware was embed as URLs into an image file by inconspicuously manipulating in-
dividual pixels. I have presented my URL hiding and detection algorithms along with
an web tool in Chapter 7.
Chapter 2
Exact Circular Pattern Matching
2.1 Introduction
Most recently in [4], the authors have presented an average-case algorithm for ECPM,
with an average-case runtime of O(n) time, where n is the length of text T .
In this chapter I present a fast algorithm for the exact circular pattern matching
problem based on filtering techniques. In particular, I employ a number of simple and
effective filters to preprocess the given pattern and the text. After this preprocessing,
I get a text of reduced length on which any existing state of the art algorithm can
be applied to get the occurrences. I have done experimental studies to compare my
algorithm with the state of the art algorithms and the results are found to be excellent.
My algorithm turns out to be much faster in practice because of the huge reduction
in the search space through filtering. I present an algorithm with better experimental
run time for searching patterns in filtered text string using the suboptimal average-
case algorithm presented in [4] which runs in O(n).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 gives a preliminary
description and problem definition along with the terminologies and concepts related
to stringology that will be used in this thesis. In Section 2.3 I describe the filtering
algorithms. Section 2.4 presents the experimental results.
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be a finite alphabet. An element of
∑∗ is called a string. The length of a string w
is denoted by |w|. The empty string  is a string of length 0, that is, || = 0. Let∑+ =∑∗− {}. For a string w = xyz; x, y and z are called a prefix, substring, and suffix of w,
respectively. The i-th character of a string w is denoted by w[i] for 1 ≤ i ≤ |w|, and the
substring of a string w that begins at position i and ends at position j is denoted by
w[i : j] for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ |w|. For convenience, let w[i : j] =  if j < i. A string y is called
a factor of w if w = xyz for x, z ∈∑∗; in this case, the string y occurs at position |x|+ 1
in w. The factor y is denoted by w[|x|+ 1 : |x|+ |y|]. A k-factor is a factor of length k.
A circular string of length m can be viewed as a traditional linear string which has
the left-most and right-most symbols wrapped around and stuck together in some
way. Under this notion, the same circular string can be seen as m different linear
strings, which would all be considered equivalent. Given a string P of length m, de-
noted by P i = P[i : m]P[1 : i − 1], 0 < i < m, the i-th rotation of P and P0 = P .
Consider, for instance, the string P = P0 = abababbc; this string has the follow-
ing rotations: P1 = bababbca,P2 = ababbcab,P3 = babbcaba,P4 = abbcabab,P5 =
bbcababa,P6 = bcababab,P7 = cabababb.
Here let us consider the problem of finding occurrences of a pattern string P of
lengthmwith circular structure in a text string T of length nwith linear structure. For
instance, the DNA sequence of many viruses have a circular structure. So if a biologist
wishes to find occurrences of a particular virus in a carrier’s DNA sequence, which
may not be circular, they must locate all positions in T where at least one rotation of
P occurs. This is the problem of circular pattern matching (CPM).
In the filtering techniques I consider the DNA alphabet, i.e.,
∑
= {A,C,G, T}.
For the filtering techniques, I represent circular pattern string consisting of these four
characters in a way that each character assigned to a numeric value of 1 to 4 forA,C,G
and T , respectively, i.e, A = 1, C = 2, G = 3 and T = 4. Let us define all the
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numeric representation of each character by i_distance(P[‘x′]), where x ∈ ∑. So,
i_distance(P[‘A′]) = 1, i_distance(P[‘C ′]) = 2, i_distance(P[‘G′]) = 3 and
i_distance(P[‘T ′]) = 4. And all individual distances over the whole string of P is
defined by i_distance(P). Again, all individual distances over a circular string of P ,
i.e, C(P) is defined by i_distance(C(P)). I also denote the numeric representation
of a string P by PN . Though I have only considered DNA alphabets, the numeric
representation can be used for all characters ∈∑+. It is called indexing of alphabet.
Example 3 Suppose I have a pattern P = atcgatg. The numeric representation of pattern
PN = 1423143. And this numeric representation has the following rotations: P1N = 4231431,
P2N = 2314314, P3N = 3143142, P4N = 1431423, P5N = 4314231, P6N = 3142314.
Let us consider two strings, P of length m and T of length n, where n ≥ m. P
is said to circularly match T at position i, or equivalently, C(P) is said to match T at
position i, if any circular shift (i.e., conjugates) of P matches T at position i of T . Lets
define sum(P) by summing up the numeric values of P , i.e, sum(i_distance(P )) in
example 3. Here sum(P0) = sum(P1) = · · · = sum(P6) = 18. Summing up over
a circular string of P , i.e, C(P) is defined by sum(C(P)). It is clear that sum(P) =
sum(C(P)).
A distance between two consecutive characters of a string P of lengthm is defined
by distance(P[i],P[i + 1]), where 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 and distance(P[i],P[i + 1]) is the
difference between the numeric values of P[i] and P[i+ 1], i.e, P[i]−P[i+ 1]. And all
distances over the whole string of P is defined by distance(P). Again, all distances
over a circular string of P , i.e, C(P) is defined by distance(C(P)). Consider Example
3. Here distance(P[1],P[2]) = 1 − 4 = −3, distance(P[2],P[3]) = 4 − 2 = 2 and so
on. A distance is referred to as the absolute distance if I take only the magnitude of
the difference. I will denote it by abs(distance(P[i],P[i + 1])). In the same example,
abs(distance(P[1],P[2])) = abs(−3) = 3.
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A modulo operation between two consecutive characters of a string P of length m
is defined by modulo(P[i],P[i+ 1]), where 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 and modulo(P[i],P[i+ 1]) is
the modulo operation between the numeric values ofP[i] andP[i+1], i.e,P[i]%P[i+1].
And all modulo operations over the whole string ofP is defined bymodulo(P). Again,
all modulo operations over a circular string of P , i.e, C(P) is defined bymodulo(C(P)).
In Example 3, modulo(P[1],P[2]) = 1%4 = 1, modulo(P[2],P[3]) = 4%2 = 0 and so
on.
A bitwise exclusive-OR (XOR) operation between two consecutive characters of
a string P of length m is defined by xor(P[i],P[i + 1]), where 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 and
xor(P[i],P[i+1]) is the XOR operation between the numeric values of P[i] and P[i+1]
i.e, P[i] ∧ P[i + 1]. And all XOR operations over the whole string of P is defined by
xor(P). Again, all XOR operations over a circular string of P , i.e, C(P) is defined by
xor(C(P)). In Example 3, xor(P[1],P[2]) = 1 ∧ 4 = 5, xor(P[2],P[3]) = 4 ∧ 2 = 6 and
so on.
LetP be a non-empty string of lengthm and T be a string of length nwhere n > m.
Let us say that there exists an occurrence ofP in T , or, more simply, thatP occurs in T ,
when P is a factor of T . Every occurrence of P can be characterised by a position in T .
Thus we say that P occurs at the starting position i in T when T [i . . . i+m− 1] = P .
The Hamming distance between strings P and T , both of length n, is the number of
positions i, 0 ≤ i < n, such that P[i] 6= T [i]. Given a non-negative integer k, write
P ≡k T if the Hamming distance between P and T is at most k.
In this chapter, I consider the following problem.
Problem 1 (Exact Circular Pattern Matching (ECPM)). Given a pattern P of length m and
a text T of length n > m, find all factors F of T such that F = P i, 0 ≤ i < m.
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2.3 Filtering algorithm
As it has been mentioned above, my algorithm is based on a number of filtering tech-
niques. Suppose I am given a pattern P and a text T . I will use the expression “C(P)
matches T at position i" to indicate that one of the conjugates of P matches T at po-
sition i. I employ the filters and identify the set N of indexes of T such that C(P)
matches at position i ∈ N . It is clear that for all j /∈ N , I do not have a match. And
also note that this does not mean that for all i ∈ N , I will have a match; I may have
false positives. So, after I have computedN , I compute T ′ which is a reduced version
of T . On the reduced text T ′ I will employ the average-case algorithms of [4] to get the
actual occurrences (the details are given in a later section). To reduce the text string T ,
I have showed six filtering techniques in [9, 3]. I have slightly changed observations
2, 3, 5 and 6 showed in [9, 3] how to get a better result. To get a better result corre-
sponding to observations 2, 3, 5 & 6 of [9, 3] I do a representation of circular string P
of lengthm, i.e, C′(P) = P[1 : m]P[1], only wrapping the first character of P in the last
position of the string P to make the cycle complete. Again while searching the pattern
P of length m in the text string T of length n where n ≥ m, I do the same wrapping in
the text string in same way that the T [i]-th character is being wrapped in the position
T [i+m] to make the cycle complete. This is done in algorithmic calculation in pattern,
not in the actual text. So, this will never effect the subsequent string matching of P in
T for sliding window calculation. These simple observations are as follows:
Observation 1 If a string A circularly matches a string B, then I must have
sum(C(A)) = sum(B).
.
Example 4 Suppose I have a pattern P = atcgatg. The numeric representation of pattern
PN = 1423143. And this numeric representation has the following rotations: P1N = 4231431,
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P2N = 2314314, P3N = 3143142, P4N = 1431423, P5N = 4314231. The text T = tgatcga
of the same length, where P circularly matches T . The numeric representation of text is
TN = 4314231. Here, sum(C(P)) = sum(T ) = 18.




Example 5 Consider the pattern string of Example 4. And a text T = tgatcga of the same
length, where P circularly matches T . The numeric representation of text T is TN = 4314231
and by completing the cycle the representation is TN = 43142314. Now C′(P)N = 14231431.
Here,
sum(abs(distance(T ))) = 14 and sum(abs(distance(C′(P)))) = 14. It is clear that sum(abs(distance(T )))
= sum(abs(distance(C(P)))).
Observation 3 If a string A matches a string B by completing the cycle of each string, then
I must have
sum(distance(B)) = sum(distance(C(A))).
Example 6 Consider the pattern string of Example 4. And a text T = tgatcga of the same
length, where P circularly matches T . The numeric representation of text T is TN = 4314231
and by completing the cycle the representation is TN = 43142314. Now C′(P)N = 14231431.
Here,
sum(distance(T )) = 0 and sum(distance(C′(P))) = 0. It is clear that sum(distance(T )) =
sum(distance(C(P))).
Observation 4 If a string A circularly matches a string B, then I must have
sum(i_distance(C(A))) = sum(i_distance(B)).
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Example 7 ConsiderExample 4. Here all individual distances over the whole string of C(P)
are sum(i_distance(‘A′)) = 2, sum(i_distance(‘C ′)) = 2, sum(i_distance(‘G′)) = 6 and
sum(i_distance(‘T ′)) = 8. And here all individual distances over the whole string of T are
sum(i_distance(‘A′)) = 2, sum(i_distance(‘C ′)) = 2, sum(i_distance(‘G′)) = 6 and
sum(i_distance(‘T ′)) = 8. It is clear that, sum(i_distance(C(P))) = sum(i_distance(T )).
Observation 5 If a string A matches a string B by completing the cycle of each string, then
I must have
sum(modulo(B)) = sum(modulo(C(A))).
Example 8 Consider the pattern string of Example 4. And a text T = tgatcga of the same
length, where P circularly matches T . The numeric representation of text T is TN = 4314231
and by completing the cycle the representation is TN = 43142314. Now C′(P)N = 14231431.
Here,
sum(modulo(T )) = 5 and sum(modulo(C′(P))) = 5. It is clear that
sum(modulo(T )) = sum(modulo(C′(P))).
Observation 6 If a string A matches a string B by completing the cycle of each string, then
I must have
sum(xor(B)) = sum(xor(C(A))).
Example 9 Consider the pattern string of Example 4. And a text T = tgatcga of the same
length, where P circularly matches T . The numeric representation of text T is TN = 4314231
and by completing the cycle the representation is TN = 43142314. Now C′(P)N = 14231431.
Here,
sum(xor(T )) = 28 and sum(xor(C′(P))) = 28. It is clear that
sum(xor(T )) = sum(xor(C′(P))).
Example 10 Suppose I have a text T = tgatcgaaagta of length n = 12 and consider
Example 3. Here the length of the pattern P is 7, i.e, m = 7. The numeric representa-
tion of text TN = 431423111341. Now, Apply observations 1 : 6 between P and T [1 : m].
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For observations 2, 3, 5 and 6 I need to wrap the first starting character of pattern P and
text T to complete the cycle like the examples 3, 4, 6 and 7, respectively. Follow Examples
4 : 9 in that case. It is the first iteration. According to the Example 2 : 7 I have a filtered
match but not the exact match. For the next iterations, apply observation 1 : 6 between P and
T [2 : m + 1]; P and T [3 : m + 2]; P and T [4 : m + 2] and so on exactly n −m = 12 − 7
= 5 times. In each iteration, do just like Examples 4 : 9. Note that, remove the calculation
of first wrapped character before starting the next iteration from T that was added to complete
the cycle for observations 2, 3, 5 and 6. This is left as an exercise for the reader.
2.3.1 Circular pattern signature using filtering techniques
In this subsection, I present an O(m) time algorithm to compute the signature of a
pattern of lengthm. This Signature will be used later to filter the text. Here, I need five
variables to save the filtered values based on Observations 1,2, 3, 5 and 6. And to save
the values of Observation 4, I need a list of size 4. I start with the stringP[1 : m]P[1], i.e.,
the concatenation of P[1 : m] and P[1]. This is due to complete the cycle in pattern P .
Now, I calculate the values according to Observations 1 to 6 for P[1 : m]. This iterates
m times to get a single value for each observation. Overall runtime of the algorithm is
O(m). Algorithm 1, ECPS_FT gives the corresponding pseudo code.
2.3.2 Reduction of search space in the text
I have presented an O(n) runtime algorithm to reduce the search space of the text
string for exact CPM in [3]. Using the same algorithm presented in [3] I present an
O(n) runtime algorithm to reduce the search space of the text applying the filtering
discussed above. In this algorithm I use the output of Algorithm ECPS_FT . I follow
the same technique that I used in Algorithm ECPS in [3]. Here I calculate values
according to Observations 1 : 6 for T [1 : m] and wrapping the first T [1] character in
T [m + 1]-th position to make cycle complete. This iterates m + 1 times to get a single
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Algorithm 1 Exact Circular Pattern Signature using Observations 1 : 6 in a single pass
1: procedure ECPS_FT (P[1 : m])
2: define five varibles for observations 1, 2, 3, 5, 6
3: define an array of size 4 for observation 4
4: define an array of size 4 to keep fixed value of A, C, G, T
5: s←P[1 : m]P[1]
6: initialize all defined variables to zero
7: initialize fixed array to {1, 2, 3, 4}
8: for i← 1 to |s| do
9: if i 6= |s| then
10: calculate different filtering values via observations 1 & 4 and make a
running sum
11: end if
12: calculate different filtering values via observations 2, 3, 5 & 6 and make a
running sum
13: end for
14: return all observations values
15: end procedure
value for each observation. Then I check it with the returned values of ECPS_FT
algorithm. If it matches, then I output the text string T [1 : m] to a file. After that, I
apply a sliding window approach as follows: I apply the same technique to calculate
the subsequent values by subtracting the value of the i-th character along with the
wrapped one and adding the same of the (i + m)-th character and also adding the
new wrapping value of i+ 1-th character. This also iterates exactly n−m times to get
other n−m values of Observations 1 to 6 and output the text string to file if it matches
to all observations in same way in each iteration. Overall runtime of the algorithm is
O(m) +O(n−m) = O(n). Algorithm RSS_FT in [3] gives the corresponding pseudo
code.
2.3.3 Fast ECPM algorithm
In [4], the authors have presented an approximate circular string matching with k-
mismatches via filtering (ACSMF-Simple). They have built a library for ACSMF-
Simple algorithm. The library is freely available and can be found here: [13]. In
Chapter 2. Exact Circular Pattern Matching 41
Algorithm 2 Exact Circular Pattern Matching (ECPM) using procedure ECPS_FT
1: procedure ECPM_FT (T [1 : n], P[1 : m])
2: CALL ECPS_FT(P[1 : m])
3: save the return value of observations 1 : 6 for further use here
4: define an array of size 4 to keep fixed value of A, C, G, T
5: initialize fixed array to {1, 2, 3, 4}
6: for i← 1 to m do
7: calculate different filtering values in T [i : m] via observations 1 : 6 and
make a running sum
8: end for
9: if 1 : 6 observations values of P[1 : m] vs 1 : 6 observations values of T [1 : m]
have a match for the calculated ranges of each filters then
10: . Found a filtered match
11: Found a candidate of T ′
12: Run ACSMF-SimpleZerok over this candidate of T ′ and report the position
accordingly if a match found
13: end if
14: for i← 1 to n−m do
15: calculate different filtering values in T [i : m] via observations 1 : 6 by
subtracting i-th value and wrapped value and adding i+m-th value to the running
sum and also adding the newly wrapped value to complete the cycle
16: if 1 : 6 filtering values of P[1 : m] vs 1 : 6 filtering values of T [i+ 1 : i+m]
have a match then
17: . Found a filtered match
18: check whether non-consecutive sequence or not. if non-consecutive, re-
port as another candidate of T ′
19: Run ACSMF-SimpleZerok over this candidate of T ′ and report the po-
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this algorithm, if I use k = 0, then ACSMF-Simple works for exact case. In what
follows, I will refer to this algorithm as ACSMF-SimpleZerok. I have implemented a
fast ECPM algorithm using ACSMF-Simple algorithm simply by putting k = 0. Algo-
rithm ECPM_FT gives the corresponding pseudo code, where I need to call ACSMF-
Simple algorithm with k = 0. In what follows, I will refer to this algorithm as Filter-
ECPM. It is clear that, the runtime of Filter-ECPM is O(n) in the average case.
2.4 Experimental results
I have implemented the modified Filter-ECPM algorithm using the ACSMF-Simple
[4]. In [4], ACSMF-Simple were implemented as library functions in the C program-
ming language under GNU/Linux operating system. The library implementation is
distributed under the GNU General Public License (GPL). ACSMF-Simple takes as in-
put the pattern P of length m, the text T of length n, and the integer threshold k < m
and returns the list of starting positions of the occurrences of the rotations of P in T
with k-mismatches as output.
I have used real genome data as experimental text string, T . I have collected that
data from [62]. Here, I have taken 299MB of data for our experiment. I have generated
random patterns of different length by a random indexing technique in this 299MB of
text string.
The experiments of [4] were conducted on a Desktop PC using one core of In-
tel i7 2600 CPU at 3.4 GHz under GNU/Linux. But, I used the library of [4] on a
PowerEdge R820 rack serve PC with 6-core of Intel Xeon processor E5-4600 product
family and 64GB of RAM under GNU/Linux. With the help of the library used in [4],
I compared the running time of Filter-ECPM [3] and ACSMF-SimpleZerok. Again, I
compared the running time of modified Filter-ECPM and ACSMF-SimpleZerok. Ta-
ble 2.1 reports the elapsed time and speed-up comparisons for various pattern sizes
(500 ≤ m ≤ 3000). As can be seen from Table 2.1, Algorithm Filter-ACPM [3] runs
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TABLE 2.1: Elapsed-time and speed-up comparisons of Filter-ECPM[3],

















500 5.938 3.025 2 1.167 5
550 7.914 3.068 3 1.456 5
600 7.691 3.06 3 1.364 6
650 7.836 3.074 3 1.006 8
700 7.739 3.072 3 1.028 8
750 7.82 3.051 3 1.073 7
800 7.839 3.209 2 1.04 8
850 8.382 3.053 3 1.055 8
900 7.646 3.055 3 1.278 6
950 7.876 3.049 3 1.402 6
1000 7.731 3.067 3 1.216 6
1600 7.334 3.206 2 1.182 6
1650 8.239 3.063 3 0.969 9
1700 7.572 3.059 2 1.18 6
1750 5.968 3.066 2 1.144 5
1800 7.551 3.064 2 1.179 6
1850 7.407 3.079 2 1.086 7
1900 7.861 3.225 2 1.126 7
1950 7.339 3.073 2 1.028 7
2000 7.814 3.062 3 1.118 7
2050 5.969 3.057 2 1.988 3
2100 5.173 3.036 2 1.187 4
2150 5.317 3.027 2 1.919 3
2200 6.032 3.168 2 1.927 3
2250 5.009 3.073 2 1.895 3
2300 5.029 3.024 2 1.891 3
2350 5.041 3.047 2 1.887 3
2400 6.036 3.046 2 1.91 3
2450 6.04 3.037 2 1.886 3
2500 7.046 3.029 2 1.976 4
2550 7.042 3.037 2 1.987 4
2600 8.043 4.029 2 2.883 3
2650 8.049 4.03 2 2.884 3
2700 8.031 4.183 2 2.892 3
2750 8.039 4.044 2 2.882 3
2800 9.026 4.067 2 2.886 3
2850 9.154 4.036 2 2.901 3
2900 10.049 4.045 2 3.134 3
2950 11.044 5.052 2 3.876 3
3000 12.044 6.039 2 3.9 3
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faster than ACSMF-SimpleZerok in all cases. And in fact the Filter-ECPM [3] achieves
a minimum of two-fold speed-up for all the pattern sizes. Again, referring to the same
table,Algorithm 2, modified Filter-ACPM runs more faster than ACSMF-SimpleZerok
in all cases. And in fact the modified Filter-ECPM achieves a minimum of three-fold
speed-up for all the pattern sizes. Now, I can summarize that, modified Filter-ECPM
of this paper, Algortihm 2 is more faster than that of Filter-ECPM [3]. Note that, I
have experimented on same set of data, same input pattern and so forth. The pro-





Earlier, I briefly described that the circular pattern, denoted C(P), corresponding to a
given pattern P = P1 . . .Pm, is formed by connecting P1 with Pm and forming a sort
of a cycle; this gives us the notion where the same circular pattern can be seen as m
different linear patterns, which would all be considered equivalent.
In this chapter I focus on the Approximate Circular Pattern Matching (ACPM)
problem. As it has been mentioned earlier in literature review, the DNA sequence of
many viruses have circular structures. So if a biologist wishes to find occurrences of
a particular virus in a carrier’s (linear) DNA sequence, (s)he must locate all positions
in T where at least one rotation of P occurs. This motivates one to study CPM. Now,
the comment made in the introduction regarding the suitability of allowing errors in
locating occurrences (i.e., approximate version) rather than considering exact occur-
rences (i.e., exact version) remains true in the context of circular pattern matching as
well. Therefore, the biologists are more interested in locating the approximate occur-
rences of one of the rotations of P in T , i.e., they like to allow errors while locating
the occurrences. In a practical context, such errors may arise due to various reasons
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ranging from natural mutations in the DNA of the virus to the practical limitations of
the lab equipments that may introduce errors while sequencing. This motivates the
study of ACPM i.e., the approximate version of the problem.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives a preliminary
description and definition of some terminologies and concepts related to stringology
that will be used throughout this chapter. In Section 3.3 I describe the filtering algo-
rithms. Section 3.4 presents the experimental results.
3.2 Problem definition
The basics of circular string have been described in the previous chapter.
Similar to Chapter 2, DNA alphabet, i.e., Σ = {a, c, g, t} is considered for my algo-
rithms and implementation for approximate circular pattern matching in this chapter.
The approach is, each character of the alphabet is associated to a numeric value as fol-
lows. Each character is assigned a unique numbers from the range [1...|Σ|]. Although
this is not essential, I conveniently assign the numbers from the range [1...|Σ|] to the
characters of Σ following their inherent lexicographical order. I use num(x), x ∈ Σ
to denote the numeric value of the character x. So, I have num(a) = 1, num(c) =
2, num(g) = 3 and num(t) = 4,. For a string S, I use the notation SN to denote the
numeric representation of the string S; and SN [i] denotes the numeric value of the
character S[i]. So, if S[i] = g then SN [i] = num(g) = 3. The concept of circular
string and their rotations also apply on their numeric representations as is illustrated
in Example 1 below.
Example 1 Suppose I have a pattern P = atcgatg. The numeric representation of P is
PN = 1423143. And this numeric representation has the following rotations: P1N = 4231431,
P2N = 2314314, P3N = 3143142, P4N = 1431423, P5N = 4314231, P6N = 3142314.
The problem I handle in this chapter can be formally defined as follows.
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Problem 1 (Approximate Circular Pattern Matching with k-mismatches (i.e mutations) (ACPM)).
Given a pattern P of length m, a text T of length n > m, and an integer threshold k < m,
find all factors F of T such that F ≡k P i for some 0 ≤ i < m. And when I have a factor
F = T [j : j + |F| − 1] such that F ≡k P i lets say that the circular pattern C(P) k-matches
T at position j. I also say that this k-match is due to P i, i.e., the ith rotation of P .
In the context of the filter based algorithms the concept of false positives and nega-
tives is important. Suppose I have an algorithmA to solve a problem B. Now suppose
that Strue represents the set of true solutions for the problem B. Further suppose that
A computes the set SA as the set of solutions for B. Now assume that Strue 6= SA.
Then, the set of false positives can be computed as follows: SA \Strue. In other words,
the set computed byA contains some solutions that are not true solutions for problem
B. And these are the false positives, because, SA falsely marked these as solutions (i.e.,
positive). On the other hand, the set of false negatives can be computed as follows:
Strue\SA. In other words, false negatives are those members in Strue that are absent in
SA. These are false negatives because SA falsely marked these as non-solutions (i.e.,
negative).
3.3 Filtering Algorithm
As it has been mentioned above, the algorithm is based on some filtering techniques.
In particular I will be extending the filters used by SimpLiFiCPM [10] to make it useful
and effective in the context of approximate circular pattern matching. In what follows,
I follow the notations of [10]. Suppose I am given a pattern P and a text T . We
will frequently and conveniently use the expression “C(P) k-matches T at position i"
(or equivalently, “P circularly k-matches T at position i") to indicate that one of the
conjugates of P k-matches T at position i (or equivalently, C(P) ≡k T ). I start with a
brief overview of the approach below.
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3.3.1 Overview of SimpLiFiACPM
The approach follows recent work in [9, 11] where I used number of filters to solve
the both exact and approximate circular pattern matching problem. In particular we
extended the ideas of [9, 11] and adapt the filters presented there so that those filters
become useful and effective for the approximate version as well.
3.3.2 Filters
I employ a total of 6 filters. I have run this experiment on three candidate patterns of
different length. As there could be 6!, i.e., 720 combinations, I have recorded the run-
ning times of the algorithm for all these combinations considering the three candidate
patterns. Although it was not possible to identify one ordering that performs best in
all instances, but it appeared that applying filter 4 first produces best result in all in-
stances. The results are available in an URL given in Appendix section9. The key to
the observations and the resulting filters is the fact that each function devises results
in a unique output when applied to the rotations of a circular string. For example,
consider a hypothetical function X . I will always have the relation that X (P) = X (P i)
for all 1 ≤ i < n. Recall that, P0 actually denotes P . For the sake of conciseness,
for such functions, I will manipulate the notation a bit and use X (C(P)) to represent
X (P i) for all 0 ≤ i < |P|.
Filter 1
I define the function sum() on a stringP of lengthm as follows: sum(P) =∑mi=1 PN [i].
My first filter, Filter 1, is based on this sum() function. I have the following observa-
tion.
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Observation 1 Consider a circular string P and a linear string T both having length n. If
C(P) ≡k T , where 0 ≤ k < n, then I must have
sum(T )− k × 4 + k × 1 ≤ sum(C(P)) ≤ sum(T ) + k × 4− k × 1.
Example 2 Consider P = atcgatg. I can easily calculate that sum(C(P)) = 18. Now,
consider T 1 = aacgatg, slightly different from P , i.e, P[2] = t 6= T 1[2] = a. As can be
easily verified, here P ≡1 T 1. According to Observation 1, in this case the lower (upper)
bound is 15 (18). Indeed, I have T 1N = 1123143 and sum(T 1) = 15, which is within the
bounds. Now consider T 2 = ttcgatg, slightly different from P , i.e, P[1] = a 6= T 2[1] = t.
As can be easily verified, here P ≡1 T 2. Therefore, in this case as well, the lower and upper
bound mentioned above hold. And indeed I have T 2N = 4423143 and sum(T 2) = 21, which
is within the bounds. Finally, consider another string T ′ = atagctg. It can be easily verified
that C(P) 6≡1 T ′. Again, the previous bounds hold in this case and I find that T ′N = 1413243
and sum(T ′) = 18. Clearly this is within the bounds of Observation 1 and in fact it is exactly
equal to sum(C(P)). This is an example of a false positive with respect to Filter 1.
Filters 2 and 3
The second and third filters, i.e., Filters 2 and 3, depend on a notion of distance be-
tween consecutive characters of a string. The distance between two consecutive char-
acters of a stringP of lengthm is defined by distance(P[i],P[i+1]) = PN [i]−PN [i+1],
where 1 ≤ i ≤ m−1. I define total_distance(P ) =∑m−1i=1 distance(P[i],P[i+ 1]). I also
define an absolute version of it: abs_total_distance(P ) =
∑m−1
i=1 abs(distance(P[i],P[i+ 1])),
where abs(x) returns the magnitude of x ignoring the sign. Before applying these two
functions on the strings to get the filters, I need to do a simple pre-processing on the
respective string, i.e., P in this case as follows. I extend the string P by concatenating
the first character of P at its end. I use ext(P) to denote the resultant string. So, I have
ext(P) = PP[1]. Since, ext(P) can simply be treated as another string, I can easily
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extend the notation and concept of C(P) over ext(P) and I continue to abuse the no-
tation a bit for the sake of conciseness as mentioned at the beginning of Section 3.3.2
(just before Section 3.3.2).
Now I have the following observation which is the basis of the Filter 2.
Observation 2 Consider a circular string P and a linear string T both having length n and
assume that A = ext(P) and B = ext(T ). If C(P) ≡k T , where 0 ≤ k < n, then I must
have
abs_total_distance(B)− k × 4 + k × 1 ≤
abs_total_distance(C(A)) ≤
abs_total_distance(B) + k × 4− k × 1.
Example 3 Consider the same strings of Example 2, i.e., P = atcgatg, T 1 = aacgatg and
T 2 = ttcgatg. As can be easily verified, here P ≡1 T 1 and P ≡1 T 2. Now consider the
extended strings and assume that A = ext(P), B1 = ext(T 1) and B2 = ext(T 2). It can be
easily verified that abs_total_distance(C(A)) is 14. Recall that T 1 is slightly different from
P , i.e, P[2] = t 6= T 1[2] = a. Now I have T 1N = 1123143. Hence B1N = 11231431.
Hence, abs_total_distance(B1) = 10 which is indeed within the bounds of Observation 2.
Now consider T 2, which is slightly different from P , i.e, P[1] = a 6= T 2[1] = t. Now I have
T 2N = 4423143. Hence B2N = 44231434. Hence, abs_total_distance(B2) = 10, which is
also within the bounds. Finally, consider T ′ = atagctg, which is again slightly different from
P . It can be easily verified that C(P) 6≡1 T ′. However, assuming that B′ = ext(T ′) I find that
abs_total_distance(B′) is still 14, which is in the range of Observation 2. This is an example
of a false positive with respect to Filter 2.
Now I present the following related observation which is the basis of the Filter 3.
Note that Observation 2 differs with Observation 3 only through using the absolute
version of the function used in the latter.
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Observation 3 Consider a circular string P and a linear string T both having length n and
assume that A = ext(P) and B = ext(T ). If C(P) ≡k T , where 0 ≤ k < n, then I must
have
total_distance(B)− k × 4 + k × 1 ≤ total_distance(C(A))
≤ total_distance(B) + k × 4− k × 1.
Example 4 Consider the same strings of Example 2, i.e., P = atcgatg, T 1 = aacgatg and
T 2 = ttcgatg. As can be easily verified, here P ≡1 T 1 and P ≡1 T 2. Now consider the
extended strings and assume that A = ext(P), B1 = ext(T 1) and B2 = ext(T 2). It can be
easily verified that abs_total_distance(C(A)) is 14. Recall that T 1 is slightly different from
P , i.e, P[2] = t 6= T 1[2] = a. Now I have T 1N = 1123143. Hence B1N = 11231431.
Hence, total_distance(B1) = 0 which is indeed within the bounds of Observation 2. Now
consider T 2, which is slightly different from P , i.e, P[1] = a 6= T 2[1] = t. Now I have
T 2N = 4423143. Hence B2N = 44231434. Hence, total_distance(B2) = 10, which is also
within the bounds. Finally, consider T ′ = atagctg, which is again slightly different from P .
It can be easily verified that C(P) 6≡1 T ′. However, assuming that B′ = ext(T ′) I find that
total_distance(B′) is still 0, which is in the range of Observation 2. This is an example of a
false positive with respect to Filter 3.
Filter 4
Filter 4 uses the sum() function used by Filter 1, albeit, in a slightly different way. In
particular, it applies the sum() function on individual characters. So, for x ∈ Σ I define
sumx(P) =
∑
1≤i≤|P|,P[i]=x PN [i]. Now I have the following observation.
Observation 4 Consider a circular string P and a linear string T both having length n. If
C(P) ≡k T , where 0 ≤ k < n, then I must have
sumx(T )− k × num(x) ≤ sumx(C(P))
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≤ sumx(T ) + k × num(x)
for all x ∈ Σ.
Example 5 Consider the same strings of Example 2, i.e., P = atcgatg, T 1 = aacgatg and
T 2 = ttcgatg. Recall that here P ≡1 T 1 and P ≡1 T 2. Now, as it has been described in
Example 2 that T 1 is slightly different from P , i.e, P[2] = t 6= T 1[2] = a. Now I have
T 1N = 1123143. Hence, suma(T 1) = 3, sumc(T 1) = 2, sumg(T 1) = 6 and sumt(T 1) =
4. According to Observation 4, in this case the lower (upper) bound for character ‘A’ is 2 (3).
And the lower (upper) bound for character ‘T’ is 4 (8), which is in the bounds. Now consider
that T 2 which is slightly from P , i.e P[1] = a 6= T 2[1] = t. Now I have T 2N = 4423143.
Hence, suma(T 2) = 1, sumc(T 2) = 2, sumg(T 2) = 6 and sumt(T 1) = 12. Here, in
this case the lower (upper) bound for character ‘A’ is 1 (2). And the lower (upper) bound for
character ‘T’ is 8 (12), which is also in the bounds. Therefore, I can summarize that I have got
a lower bound and an upper bound according to Observation 4 for these two characters ‘A’ and
‘T’, others are unchanged. For this example the Observation 4 shows the overall lower (upper)
bound for character ‘A’ is 1 (3) and the lower (upper) bound for character ‘T’ is 4 (12). Finally,
consider T ′ = atagctg, which is again slightly different from P . It can be easily verified that
C(P) 6≡1 T ′. Now, T ′N = 1413243. However, as I can still find that, suma(T ′) = 2,
sumc(T ′) = 2, sumg(T ′) = 6 and sumt(T ′) = 8, which is in the bounds of Observation 4.
This is an example of a false positive with respect to Filter 4.
Filter 5
In Filter 5, I use modulo() operation between two consecutive characters. A modulo()
operation between two consecutive characters of a string P of length m is defined as
follows: modulo(P[i],P[i + 1]) = PN [i]%PN [i + 1], where 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1. We define
sum_modulo(P) to be the summation of the results of the modulo operations on the
consecutive characters ofP . More formally, sum_modulo(P ) =∑m−1i=1 modulo(P[i],P[i+ 1]).
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Now I present the following observation which is the basis of Filter 5. Note that this
observation is applied on the extended versions of the respective strings.
Observation 5 Consider a circular string P and a linear string T both having length n and
assume that A = ext(P) and B = ext(T ). If C(P) ≡k T , where 0 ≤ k < n, then, I must
have
sum_modulo(B)− k × 4 + k × 0 ≤ sum_modulo(C(A))
≤ sum_modulo(B) + k × 4− k × 0.
Note carefully that the function sum_modulo() has been applied on the extended strings.
Example 6 Consider the same four strings of Example 3, i.e., P = atcgatg, T 1 = aacgatg
and T 2 = ttcgatg. As can be easily verified, here P ≡1 T 1 and P ≡1 T 2. Now consider
the extended strings and assume that A = ext(P), B1 = ext(T 1) and B2 = ext(T 2). It
can be easily verified that sum_modulo(C(A)) is 5. Recall that T 1 is slightly different from
P , i.e, P[2] = t 6= T 1[2] = a. Now I have T 1N = 1123143. Hence B1N = 11231431.
Hence, sum_modulo(B1) = 5 which is indeed within the bounds of Observation 5. Now
consider T 2, which is slightly different from P , i.e, P[1] = a 6= T 2[1] = t. Now I have
T 2N = 4423143. Hence B2N = 44231434. Hence, sum_modulo(B2) = 7, which is also
within the bounds. Finally, consider T ′ = atagctg, which is again slightly different from P .
It can be easily verified that C(P) 6≡1 T ′. However, assuming that B′ = ext(T ′) I find that
sum_modulo(B′) is still 5, which is in the range of Observation 5. This is an example of a
false positive with respect to Filter 5.
Filter 6
In Filter 6 I employ the xor() operation. A bitwise exclusive-OR (xor()) operation
between two consecutive characters of a string P of length m is defined as follows:
xor(P[i],P[i+ 1]) = PN [i]∧PN [i+ 1], where 1 ≤ i ≤ m−1. I define sum_xor(P) to be
the summation of the results of the xor operations on the consecutive characters of P .
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More formally, sum_xor(P ) =
∑m−1
i=1 xor(P[i],P[i+ 1]). Now I present the following
observation which is the basis of Filter 6. Note that this observation is applied on the
extended versions of the respective strings.
Observation 6 Consider a circular string P and a linear string T both having length n and
assume that A = ext(P) and B = ext(T ). If C(P) ≡k T , then, I must have
sum_xor(B)− k × 14 + k × 0 ≤ sum_xor(C(A))
≤ sum_xor(B) + k × 14 + k × 0.
Note carefully that the function sum_xor() has been applied on the extended strings.
Example 7 Consider the same four strings of Example 3, i.e., P = atcgatg, T 1 = aacgatg
and T 2 = ttcgatg. As can be easily verified, here P ≡1 T 1 and P ≡1 T 2. Now consider
the extended strings and assume that A = ext(P), B1 = ext(T 1) and B2 = ext(T 2). It
can be easily verified that sum_xor(C(A)) is 28. Recall that T 1 is slightly different from P ,
i.e, P[2] = t 6= T 1[2] = a. Now I have T 1N = 1123143. Hence B1N = 11231431. Hence,
sum_xor(B1) = 20 which is indeed within the bounds of Observation 6. Now consider T 2,
which is slightly different from P , i.e, P[1] = a 6= T 2[1] = t. Now I have T 2N = 4423143.
Hence B2N = 44231434. Hence,sum_xor(B2) = 28, which is also within the bounds.
Finally, consider T ′ = atagctg, which is again slightly different from P . It can be easily
verified that C(P) 6≡1 T ′. However, assuming that B′ = ext(T ′) I find that sum_xor(B′)
is still 28, which is in the range of Observation 6. This is an example of a false positive with
respect to Filter 6.
3.3.3 Reduction of search space in the text
Now I present an O(n) time algorithm to reduce the search space of the text applying
the six filters presented above. It takes as input the pattern P[1 : m] of length m and
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Algorithm 3 Approximate Circular Pattern Signature using Observations 1 : 6 in a
single pass
1: procedure ACPS_FT (P[1 : m])
2: define three variables for observations 1, 2, 3, 5, 6
3: define an array of size 4 for observation 4
4: define an array of size 4 to keep fixed value of A, C, G, T
5: s←P[1 : m]P[1]
6: initialize all defined variables to zero
7: initialize fixed array to {1, 2, 3, 4}
8: for i← 1 to |s| do
9: if i 6= |s| then
10: calculate different filtering values via observations 1 & 4 and make a
running sum
11: end if
12: calculate different filtering values via observations 2, 3, 5 & 6 and make a
running sum
13: end for
14: return all observations values
15: end procedure
the text T [1 : n] of length n. It calls Procedure ACPS_FT with P[1 : m] as parameter
and uses the output. It then applies the same technique that is applied in Procedure
ACPS_FT (Algorithm 3). I apply a sliding window approach with window length
of m and calculate the values applying the functions according to Observations 1 : 6
on the factor of T captured by the window. Note that for Observations 2, 3, 5 and 6,
I need to consider the extended string and hence the factor of T within the window
need be extended accordingly for calculating the values. After calculating the values
for a factor of T , I check it against the returned values of Procedure ACPS_FT . If
it matches, then I output the factor to a file. Note that in case of overlapping factors
(e.g., when the consecutive windows need to output the factors to a file), Procedure
ACPS_FT outputs only the non-overlapped characters. And Procedure ACPS_FT
uses a $ marker to mark the boundaries of non-consecutive factors, where $ /∈ Σ.
Now note that I can compute the values of consecutive factors of T using the slid-
ing window approach quite efficiently as follows. For the first factor, i.e., T [1..m] I
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Algorithm 4 Reduction of Search Space in a Text String using procedure ACPS_FT
1: procedure RSS_FT (T [1 : n], P[1 : m])
2: CALL CPS_FT(P[1 : m])
3: save the return value of observations 1 : 6 for further use here
4: define an array of size 4 to keep fixed value of A, C, G, T
5: initialize fixed array to {1, 2, 3, 4}
6: lastIndex← 1
7: for i← 1 to m do
8: calculate different filtering values in T [1 : m] via observations 1 : 6 and
make a running sum
9: end for
10: if 1 : 6 observations values of P[1 : m] vs 1 : 6 observations values of T [1 : m]
have a match then
11: . Found a filtered match
12: Output to file T [1 : m]
13: lastIndex← m
14: end if
15: for i← 1 to n−m do
16: calculate different filtering values in T [1 : m] via observations 1 : 6 by
subtracting i-th value along with wrapped value and adding i + m-th value and
new wrapped vale to the running sum
17: if 1 : 6 filtering values of P[1 : m] vs 1 : 6 filtering values of T [i+ 1 : i+m]
have a match then
18: . Found a filtered match
19: if i > lastIndex then
20: Output an end marker $ to file
21: end if
22: if i+m > lastIndex then
23: if i < lastIndex then
24: j ← lastIndex+ 1
25: else
26: j ← i+ 1
27: end if
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exactly follow the strategy of Procedure ACPS_FT . When it is done, I slide the win-
dow by one character and I only need to remove the contribution of the left most
character of the previous window and add the contribution of the rightmost character
of the new window. The functions are such that this can be done very easily using
simple constant time operations. The only other issue that needs be taken care of is
due to the use of the extended string in two of the filters. But this too does not need
more than a few simple constant time operations. Therefore, overall runtime of the
algorithm is O(m) + O(n − m) = O(n). The algorithm is presented in the form of
Procedure RSS_FT (Algorithm 4).
3.3.4 The combined algorithm
I have already described the two main components of the algorithm, namely, Proce-
dure ACPS_FT and Procedure RSS_FT , which in fact calls the former. Now Pro-
cedure RSS_FT provides a reduced text T ′ (say) after filtering. At this point I can
use any algorithm that can solve ACPM and apply it over T ′ and output the occur-
rences. Now, suppose I use Algorithm A at this stage which runs in O(f(|T ′|)) time.
Then, clearly, the overall running time of the approach isO(n)+O(f(|T ′|)). In the im-
plementation I have used the recent algorithm of [4]. In particular, in [4], the authors
have presented an approximate circular string matching algorithm with k-mismatches
(ACSMF-Simple) via filtering. They have built a library for ACSMF-Simple algorithm.
The library is freely available and can be found here: [13]. I only apply ACSMF-Simple
on the reduced string.
3.4 Experimental Results
I have implemented SimpLiFiACPM and conducted extensive experiments to analyze
its performance. I show the comparison based on the experimental result between
ACSMF-Simple [4] and the algorithm SimpLiFiACPM. ACSMF-Simple [4] has been
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implemented as library functions in the C programming language under GNU/Linux
operating system. The library implementation is distributed under the GNU General
Public License (GPL). It takes as input the pattern P of length m, the text T of length
n, and the integer threshold k < m and returns the list of starting positions of the
occurrences of the rotations of P in T with k-mismatches as output.
3.4.1 Dataset
I have used real genome data in the experiments as the text string, T . This data has
been collected from [62]. Here, we have taken 1GB of data for the experiments. I have
generated random patterns of different length by a random indexing technique in this
1GB of text string.
3.4.2 Environment
I have conducted the experiments on a PowerEdge R820 rack server PC with 6-core of
Intel Xeon processor E5-4600 product family and 64GB of RAM under GNU/Linux.
I have coded SimpLiFiACPM in C++ using a GNU compiler with General Public Li-
cense (GPL). As it has been mentioned already above, the implementation of SimpLi-
FiACPM uses the ACSMF-Simple [4]. With the help of the library used in [4], I have
compared the running time of ACSMF-Simple of [4] and SimpLiFiACPM.
3.4.3 Experiments
Because I have 6 different filters, the order of applying the filter may turn out to be
important in the final performance of the algorithm. I have done preliminary exper-
iments to identify the best order to apply the filters. I have run this experiment on
three candidate patterns of different length. As there could be 6!, i.e., 720 combina-
tions, I have recorded the running times of the algorithm for all these combinations
considering the three candidate patterns. Although it was not possible to identify one
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TABLE 3.1: Elapsed-time (in seconds) and speed-up comparisons
among ACSMF-Simple[4] and the algorithm considering all the six fil-














2000 2 32.827 16.345 2
3000 2 28.464 13.650 2
4000 2 32.286 15.456 2
5000 5 39.577 18.456 2
6000 5 35.848 15.345 2
2000 5 38.333 16.986 2
3000 5 39.900 18.976 2
4000 5 28.339 12.345 2
5000 5 39.577 20.436 2
6000 5 35.848 14.547 2
5000 7 44.173 19.546 2
6000 7 64.362 28.435 2
7000 7 59.190 24.879 2
8000 7 63.095 32.435 2
9000 7 58.588 26.789 2
10000 10 45.601 20.456 2
50000 10 46.683 20.436 2
100000 10 100.306 45.677 2
150000 10 105.188 55.567 2
200000 10 122.252 62.345 2
250000 12 125.583 62.988 2
300000 12 137.835 71.345 2
350000 12 145.008 75.345 2
400000 12 155.451 72.345 2
450000 12 170.058 76.345 2
500000 12 200.165 80.984 2
550000 15 250.813 100.436 2
650000 15 270.142 120.454 2
700000 15 292.497 140.546 2
750000 15 330.475 172.345 2
800000 15 401.183 193.349 2
850000 15 498.335 250.567 2
900000 20 560.817 240.568 2
950000 20 705.784 300.567 2
1000000 20 870.142 370.546 2
1100000 20 901.033 450.891 2
1150000 20 930.599 530.567 2
1200000 20 955.113 552.345 2
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TABLE 3.2: Elapsed-time (in seconds) and speed-up comparisons
among ACSMF-Simple[4] and SimpLiFiACPM-[1..3] (considering first















2000 2 32.827 26.488 1
3000 2 28.464 26.333 1
4000 2 32.286 25.856 1
5000 5 39.577 24.185 2
6000 5 35.848 24.021 1
2000 5 38.333 24.015 2
3000 5 39.900 23.983 2
4000 5 28.339 23.837 1
5000 5 39.577 24.185 2
6000 5 35.848 24.021 1
5000 7 44.173 30.282 1
6000 7 64.362 26.983 2
7000 7 59.190 27.087 2
8000 7 63.095 27.333 2
9000 7 58.588 26.615 2
10000 10 45.601 26.050 2
50000 10 46.683 70.993 1
100000 10 100.306 57.942 2
150000 10 105.188 758.018 0
200000 10 122.252 536.863 0
250000 12 125.583 453.232 0
300000 12 137.835 101.059 1
350000 12 145.008 272.283 1
400000 12 155.451 334.928 0
450000 12 170.058 449.691 0
500000 12 200.165 311.247 1
550000 15 250.813 506.227 0
650000 15 270.142 646.575 0
700000 15 292.497 1126.407 0
750000 15 330.475 1213.848 0
800000 15 401.183 1349.880 0
850000 15 498.335 1579.911 0
900000 20 560.817 1289.475 0
950000 20 705.784 894.105 1
1000000 20 870.142 259.141 3
1100000 20 901.033 1328.620 1
1150000 20 930.599 1636.091 1
1200000 20 955.113 1203.015 1
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ordering that performs best in all instances, but it appeared that applying filter 4 first
produces best result in all instances.
3.4.4 Experimental Results
Here I represent the main experimental results and comparisons between my algo-
rithm and ACSMF-Simple of [4]. Table 3.1 reports the elapsed time and speed-up
comparisons for various pattern sizes (2000 ≤ m ≤ 1200000) and for various mis-
match sizes (2 ≤ k ≤ 20). As can be seen from Table 3.1, the algorithm runs faster
than ACSMF-Simple in all cases.
In order to analyze and understand the effect of the filters I have run a second set of
experiments as follows. I have run experiments on three variants of SimpLiFiACPM
where the first variant (SimpLiFiACPM-[1..3]) only employs Filters 1 through 3, the
second variant (SimpLiFiACPM-[1..4]) only employs Filters 1 through 4, and finally
the third variant (SimpLiFiACPM-[1..5]) employs Filters 1 through 5. Table 3.2, 3.3
and 3.4 reports the elapsed time and speed-up comparisons considering various pat-
tern sizes (2000 ≤ m ≤ 1200000) for ACSMF-Simple and the above-mentioned three
variants of SimpLiFiACPM. As can be seen from Table 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, ACSMF-Simple
is able to beat SimpLiFiACPM-[1..3] in a number of cases. However, SimpLiFiACPM-
[1..4] and SimpLiFiACPM-[1..5] significantly run faster than ACSMF-Simple of [4] in
all cases. This indicates that as more and more effective filters are imposed, the algo-
rithm performs better. The program source code link is available at 9.
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TABLE 3.3: Elapsed-time (in seconds) and speed-up comparisons
among ACSMF-Simple[4] and SimpLiFiACPM-[1..4] (considering first















2000 2 32.827 16.544 2
3000 2 28.464 15.733 2
4000 2 32.286 12.564 3
5000 5 39.577 14.456 3
6000 5 35.848 14.220 3
2000 5 38.333 10.167 4
3000 5 39.900 13.976 3
4000 5 28.339 11.456 2
5000 5 39.577 12.458 3
6000 5 35.848 14.434 2
5000 7 44.173 22.439 2
6000 7 64.362 34.566 2
7000 7 59.190 27.546 2
8000 7 63.095 23.335 3
9000 7 58.588 25.547 2
10000 10 45.601 26.568 2
50000 10 46.683 44.456 1
100000 10 100.306 50.466 2
150000 10 105.188 70.436 1
200000 10 122.252 100.345 1
250000 12 125.583 102.353 1
300000 12 137.835 90.346 2
350000 12 145.008 101.345 1
400000 12 155.451 100.435 2
450000 12 170.058 120.435 1
500000 12 200.165 99.435 2
550000 15 250.813 100.435 2
650000 15 270.142 130.435 2
700000 15 292.497 150.455 2
750000 15 330.475 220.435 1
800000 15 401.183 205.456 2
850000 15 498.335 350.435 1
900000 20 560.817 330.435 2
950000 20 705.784 450.455 2
1000000 20 870.142 430.345 2
1100000 20 901.033 500.546 2
1150000 20 930.599 600.435 2
1200000 20 955.113 700.345 1
Chapter 3. Aproximate Circular Pattern Matching 63
TABLE 3.4: Elapsed-time (in seconds) and speed-up comparisons
among ACSMF-Simple[4] and SimpLiFiACPM-[1..5] (considering first















2000 2 32.827 15.435 2
3000 2 28.464 17.434 2
4000 2 32.286 13.435 2
5000 5 39.577 20.234 2
6000 5 35.848 17.435 2
2000 5 38.333 15.345 2
3000 5 39.900 19.235 2
4000 5 28.339 14.455 2
5000 5 39.577 17.343 2
6000 5 35.848 20.234 2
5000 7 44.173 20.324 2
6000 7 64.362 30.435 2
7000 7 59.190 25.346 2
8000 7 63.095 20.344 3
9000 7 58.588 30.235 2
10000 10 45.601 25.456 2
50000 10 46.683 45.465 1
100000 10 100.306 52.343 2
150000 10 105.188 69.324 2
200000 10 122.252 78.346 2
250000 12 125.583 90.468 1
300000 12 137.835 93.435 1
350000 12 145.008 140.435 1
400000 12 155.451 102.345 2
450000 12 170.058 72.345 2
500000 12 200.165 101.234 2
550000 15 250.813 120.435 2
650000 15 270.142 140.325 2
700000 15 292.497 145.345 2
750000 15 330.475 170.435 2
800000 15 401.183 207.345 2
850000 15 498.335 330.985 2
900000 20 560.817 340.786 2
950000 20 705.784 432.546 2
1000000 20 870.142 542.435 2
1100000 20 901.033 600.345 2
1150000 20 930.599 605.234 2
1200000 20 955.113 650.234 1
Chapter 4
Client Side Web tool For Circular
Pattern Matching
4.1 Web tool
This chapter deals with a client side development approach for Circular Pattern Match-
ing (CPM) problem. I explained in previous chapter in great detail about CPM which
appears as an interesting problem in many biological contexts. In short, CPM is to find
all possible occurrences of the rotations of a pattern P of lengthm in a text T of length
n with k mismatches. I have developed a lightweight and fast web based tool for
users. Much of the speed can be attributed to the fact that actual computation is done
in client machine instead of uploading big chunks of data in the server. I have up-
loaded the web tool on http://samirsoftware.com/acpm/index.html [63]. The source
codes are available in my repository http://www.samirsoftware.com/Tool.zip [64].
The source code link is available at 9 too.
4.2 Contribution
The main contribution in this chapter is a fast and efficient browser based tool which
dramatically reduces the size of data by using filter based approximate circular pat-
tern matching approach and find out the match. To my knowledge while this thesis
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is underway, this is the first web based circular pattern matching tool that operates
in client side. The idea behind the approach is quite simple and intuitive. The users
do not need to install any software or do not need to upload the big file in the server.
My development approach works with big data in client side by using lower memory
working as chunk by chunk without uploading any data to web server. Instead of
program running in the web server, the java script code is transported in the browser
in run-time and does the computation. The user does not require to install any soft-
ware because the computation is done in the browser. I presented a web based tool for
an effective lightweight filtering technique to reduce the search space of the Circular
Pattern Matching problem which works for both exact and approximate circular pat-
tern matching. I worked on 3 GB data but it can easily work with large data because
the memory does not load the data at a time. It works chunk by chunk.
4.3 Description of the tool
The Approximate Circular String Search online tool searches an input text for matches
of an input pattern. A match can either be the original input pattern or any rotation
of the input pattern. A match can be defined by the user to be exact or approximate
within the user specified bound k.
The text is first filtered by 3 filters to a reduced search space, represented by a
list of 0-indexed (index starts from 0) locations in the text. These indices represent
the location of candidate matches and may include false positives. However these
false positives can optionally be removed through an additional verification process
to produce a final definitive list of matches.




FIGURE 4.1: Web tool interface
A, B Pattern and Text Input: Regions allow a user to enter data to be used in the
string search. These can be entered manually or added from a text file. Data in
these files is not uploaded to the web server, instead the algorithm will run on
the client-side where the data is located.
C Results Window: Displays the 0-indexed locations in the text where potential or
precise matches are found. A user may download this data to a file for further
analysis.
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D Algorithm Options: User specifies the parameters by which the search algorithm
should operate.
• K Bound: Describes the maximum number of mismatches between pattern
and text that may be allowed. K = 0 is equivalent to exact circular string
matching. K = 1 means all but 1 character was matched etc.
• Filters: There are 3 filters that may be applied in the filtering stage. Apply-
ing additional filters may increase the search time but reduces the size of
the final list of candidate locations. I have done 720 combinations of exper-
iments based on 6 filters to understand which order of filters produce the
better result. Clearly filter 4 is the winner that performs better when it is
in the first position in the experiment in terms of execution time for each
variation of input size. But it is not possible to come into conclusion on
the serial of other filters conclusively. However, by manual observation of
the filters, it appears the following filters perform better. So I have chosen
the following 3 filters and reiterating the observation below. All usual no-
tations below convey the same meaning as of Chapter 3. In my tool, I am
calling the following three observation as Filter 1, 2 and 3 in combo box of
chosen filters for this tool.
1. Observation 1 Consider a circular string P and a linear string T both hav-
ing length n. If C(P) ≡k T , where 0 ≤ k < n, then I must have
sum(T )− k × 4 + k × 1 ≤ sum(C(P)) ≤ sum(T ) + k × 4− k × 1.
2. Observation 2 Consider a circular string P and a linear string T both hav-
ing length n and assume that A = ext(P) and B = ext(T ). If C(P) ≡k T ,
where 0 ≤ k < n, then I must have
abs_total_distance(B)− k × 4 + k × 1 ≤
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abs_total_distance(C(A)) ≤
abs_total_distance(B) + k × 4− k × 1.
3. Observation 3 Consider a circular string P and a linear string T both hav-
ing length n. If C(P) ≡k T , where 0 ≤ k < n, then I must have
sumx(T )− k × num(x) ≤ sumx(C(P))
≤ sumx(T ) + k × num(x)
for all x ∈ Σ.
• Remove False Positives: If this option is not checked, the list of locations pro-
duced will represent potential locations of matches and may contain false
positives. If this option is checked, the list of locations will be the final
correct list of match locations.
E Progress Bar: Monitors progress of algorithm execution.
Chapter 5
Web tools security in development
perspective
5.1 Problem Definition of Web Vulnerabilities
Web tools attracts the inherent vulnerabilities of web. The common web vulnerabili-
ties to date from software security research illustrated by the CWE/SANS on top 25
most dangerous software errors report [47] in which web application vulnerabilities
ranked the top. In addition, the industry scanning tools[48] gives the insight about the
issues. According to the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) the most
common web vulnerabilities are SQL Injection, Cross-site Scripting (XSS), Cross-Site
Request Forgery (CSRF), Security Misconfiguration, Unvalidated Redirects and For-
wards, No Account Lockout, Insecure Password Policy and HTTPS not enforced as
presented in their Top Ten Most Critical Web Application Security Risks Report [49].
In most cases the hackers use these common vulnerabilities to get access to the system
which later turns out to be disastrous for the organizations [47].
5.1.1 Applications and motivations
While developing web tools for circular string, I came across the web security issue.
Most sites in current web spectrum are vulnerable. In fact, 86% of websites contain at
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least one ’serious’ vulnerability according to the WhiteHat Security Statistics Report
2015 [46]. In this chapter, the vulnerabilities mentioned here has been addressed in
a structured algorithmic manner. Providing very easy and effective guidelines and
solutions in practical context is the main motivations of this chapter. The program
source code link is available at 9.
5.1.2 Organization of the chapter
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The three most serious vulnerabili-
ties (SQL injection, Cross-site Scripting (XSS), Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)) are
treated in separate section FixWebSQLInjection on 5.2, FixWebXSS 5.3, FixWebC-
SRF 5.4 respectively. The rest of the vulnerabilities are treated together in section
FixOtherVulnerabilities5.5.
5.1.3 My contribution
This chapter presents guidelines and solutions for each vulnerability. The proposed
solutions are described in separate sections in an algorithmic manner. The solutions
came across by learning the reasons of vulnerability[47] and penetration technique
used by the scanning tools [48] to exploit the vulnerability. The vulnerability details
have been described briefly to cover the basics of common vulnerabilities. I have given
detail description of the solutions in the next few sections. A very brief overview of
each problem and the solutions with the best practices as well as PSEUDO-CODE has
been provided in the chapter. The relevant example codes with vbscript and javascript
has been uploaded in the url [65]. The javascript code I have provided can be plugged
directly in web application at the client side because javascript is de facto standard of
browser based client side language.
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5.2 FixWebSQLInjection
5.2.1 Vulnerability detail
As mentioned previously, SQL Injection was stated in top of the list in the CWE/SANS
Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors report [47]. XSS attacks is in rank 4 and the
CSRF attacks in number 12. That is a strong proof of how these three vulnerabilities
are growing rapidly throughout the year among the other web and software security
issues.
SQL is a Structured Query Language that manage (add, delete, edit, and retrieve)
the stored data in a relational database. It is the most popular way for users to com-
municate with the database. Furthermore, SQL injection attack is an attack in which
the malicious code is inserted into strings that are later passed to an instance of SQL
Server for parsing and execution.
In other words, SQL Injection attack occurs when untrusted data is sent to an in-
terpreter as part of a command or query. In web perspective that can be done by the
attacker provides SQL code to a user input box through the form in the web applica-
tion to gain unauthorized access to the database. Any procedure that constructs SQL
statements should be reviewed for injection vulnerabilities because SQL Server will
execute all syntactically valid queries that it receives. Even parametrized data can be
manipulated by a skilled and determined attacker [66].
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FIGURE 5.1: SQL Injection attack using a login form
[67]
SQL injection is a threat for any data driven applications regardless of their un-
derlying databases. It is considered to be the most effective method for stealing data
from the back-end nowadays. However, there are many forms of SQL injection ei-
ther based on the method of injection (through user input, through cookies, through
server variables or second-order injection) or based on the attacker intention [68] with
the injectable parameters such as performing database finger-printing, determining
database schema, extracting data, adding or modifying data, performing denial of
service, evading detection, bypassing authentication, executing remote commands or
performing privilege escalation etc. However, the technical form of SQL Injection can
be categorized according to the type of the attack against the databases.
• SQL Manipulation: By modifying the SQL statement in different ways for ex-
ample, through using different operations such as UNION or by changing the
WHERE clause of the statement to retrieve different outputs or through some
error messages that contain the table and column name which will help the at-
tacker to extract the required data.
• Code Injection: by injecting malicious code when inserting new SQL statement,
for example, after extracting the table and column’s name by SQL manipulation
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method, these can be inserted in SQL statement to extract information to retrieve
more data from database.
• Function Call Injection: The attacker can execute built in procedure through
calling functions to manipulate the data in the database .
• Buffer Overflow: By providing more data to an input variable more than the
amount of space allocated for that specific input, causing overwriting the mem-
ory elsewhere in the application to modify it.
Interested readers are referred to read more on [68].
5.2.2 Solutions
This solution here is to provide with the generic approach. It divides the solutions
of SQL injection to three categories by which malicious query can be passed through
database via web applications.
5.2.3 Type check
It needs to trap each query-string and form fields based on what application is ex-
pecting. Input length, boundaries and expected values must have to be trapped. If
an input field passes a value that does not fit with the requirements of that field the
specific web application is expecting, must have to be trapped.
The solution deals with Boolean Algorithm 5, Byte Algorithm 6, Currency Algo-
rithm 7, Date Algorithm 8, Double Algorithm 9, Integer Algorithm 10 and String Al-
gorithm 11. These few data types are just for guidance purpose. Users must have to
trap all different data type explicitly that the query is expecting from each individual
form field in the individual web application. If any of the data type doesn’t match
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with the expected input for an individual form field, then it has to be considered as
a breach. This kind of error sometimes are genuine mistake by user and sometimes
could be hacking attempt. For example when user mistakenly types phone number
in the address field, the error will be trapped. So the error must have to be managed
with proper error message so that user can get help. In the same time, the hackers
cannot bypass with the wrong data type.
Algorithm 5 IsValidBoolean(S)
1: procedure ISVALIDBOOLEAN(S)
2: if S is boolean then
3: return TRUE
4: else





2: TEST programmatically whethere S is a BYTE
3: if S is BYTE then
4: return TRUE
5: else
6: return RETURN ERROR with possible breach
7: end if
8: end procedure
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Algorithm 7 IsValidCurrency(S)
1: procedure ISVALIDCURRENCY(S)
2: TEST programmatically whethere S is a Currency
3: if S is a Currency then
4: return TRUE
5: else





2: TEST programmatically whethere S is a date
3: if S is a Date then
4: return TRUE
5: else





2: TEST programmatically whethere S is a double
3: if S is a Double then
4: return TRUE
5: else
6: return RETURN ERROR with possible breach
7: end if
8: end procedure
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Algorithm 10 IsValidInteger(S)
1: procedure ISVALIDINTEGER(S)
2: TEST programmatically whethere S is an integer
3: if S is a Integer then
4: return TRUE
5: else





2: TEST programmatically whethere S is a string
3: if S is a string then
4: return TRUE
5: else
6: return RETURN ERROR with possible breach
7: end if
8: end procedure
5.2.4 Length, minimum, maximum and regular expression check
Expected length of each form field based on database field’s length must have to be
trapped. The minimum and maximum value of the field need to be trapped in both
client and server side logic. From the usability perspective the minimum and max-
imum boundary needs to be defined in application design so that each field can be
trapped. We have written here two version of such trap. The former is just plain min-
imum and maximum check and the later one is with the regular expression. Regular
expression can dictate what is allowed or not in a specific filed.
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For example, Name field can not have numbers or special characters at all, phone
number cannot have any letters or special characters etc. It is possible to trap by writ-
ing the regular expression and validating the input with the routine before passing
this into query. Based on the practitioner’s need for a specific form field, any of the
procedures Validate Min Max 12 or Validate Min Max with Regular Expression 13 can
be used.
Algorithm 12 IsValidMinMaxn(S, intMinLength, intMaxLength)
1: procedure IsV alidMinMaxn(String S, Integer intMinLength, Integer int-
MaxLength)
2: if 0 = intMaxLength then
3: intMaxLength = Len(varTemp)
4: end if
5: if LENGTH(S) < intMinLength Or LENGTH(S) > intMaxLength then
6: EXIT IsV alidMinMax with ERROR
7: end if
8: end procedure
Algorithm 13 IsValidTexWithREgularExpression(S, iMinLen, iMaxLen , regexp)
1: procedure IsV alidTexWithREgularExpression(S, iMinLen, iMaxLen , regexp)




5: EXIT IsValidMinMax with ERROR
6: end if
7:end procedure
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5.2.5 SQL safe query
In SQL injection there are common words, characters and syntax those are used for
attack. Developers can write a common functionality to address this issue. We have
written a common routine SQLSafe 14. Over time the practitioners can modify by





3: if LENGTH(S) = 0 then
4: EXIT SQLSafe
5: end if
6: if ”′)OR′”Exist in S then
7: EXIT SQLSafe with ERROR
8: end if
9: if ”′)AND′”ExistinS then
10: EXIT SQLSafe with ERROR
11: end if
12: REPLACE "’" WITH ""
13: REPLACE "–" Or "-" WITH ""
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5.2.6 Use a middle tier
It is a best practice to use a middle tier or at least a database layer to have a greater
flexibility in managing the vulnerability. This will help trapping the SQL injection in
application level directly before the database call. Using stored procedure or separate
function for query is a best practice of such modular implementation. Our procedure
StoredProcedureCall 15 gives the guidelines how to call a stored procedure.
Before calling the stored procedure or separate data driven function, the practi-
tioner will need to validate the parameters datatype, each SQL field’s data length and
the exact number of parameters explicitly assigned. Any violation on length, data
type and number of parameters nwill result in a failure and will be considered as a
possible security breach.
The same technique can be used for desktop based application too, although the
focus of our write-up us web application. SQL injection can happen via XSS attack
too which has been described in FixWebXSS section 5.3. So the solution on proce-
dure CrossScriptingTest 16 will need to be called from server side too before calling
the databse. In the codes [65] two versions have been written. CrossScriptingTest
has been written in classic asp vbscript code[65] for server side implementation and
CrossScriptingTestJS[65] has been written in javascript for using from client side.
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Algorithm 15 StoredProcedureCall
1: procedure STOREDPROCEDURECALL
2: Explicitly check each parameters datatype
3: Explicitly check each parameters datalenth defined in SQL
4: if both of above matches then







Cross-site scripting (XSS) is one of the most prevalent, obstinate, and dangerous vul-
nerabilities in web applications[47]. Yet, it is still remains as a big problem for web
applications, despite the bulk of solutions provided so far[69]. The XSS attack occurs
by injecting a malicious Javascript or other untrusted browser-executable content into
a web page that the user application generates. And that is considered as a result of a
failure to validate the inputs from the web site users.
In other words, XSS attacks is a result of weak input validation on the web appli-
cation that will permit the attacker to execute the malicious scripts that was injected
on the victim’s web browser to steal data, cookies, passwords etc or the code may be
sent to another user and executed on their browser cause serious security exploita-
tions.[1][70]
Although the XSS is an attack on the client-side web browser, but it will gain the
attacker an access to the web server side as well.
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5.3.2 XSS injection process
There are different techniques to inject the malicious Java Script code into the victim’s
web application. However, the easiest way is through the web application that accepts
inputs from the user side and that is usually the case in dynamic web applications or
through utilizing the plug-ins for example (Flash XSS vulnerability). Furthermore, the
XSS attacks requires three parties (attacker web application, victim web application
and victim web browser).
FIGURE 5.2: Cross-Site Scripting exploitation [1]
Cookie stealing: Cookies are the most sensitive Information that a Web site saves
about each user However, XSS attacker can steal them by injecting the XSS attack
vectors on the vulnerable website for intention of stealing these cookies specially the
session IDs or as it called (session hijacking).
Phishing attacks: The XSS attacker can steal the victim’s credentials information
directly from them by injecting the code of a fake log in page identical the original one
and trick the victims into entering their log in details in it.
Key logging: The attacker can utilize the capabilities of keyboard event listener to
trace all the keystrokes of the victims and transfer this information to the web server
for accessing the sensitive information like password, credit card numbers etc.[1]
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5.3.3 XSS attacks
Stored or Persistent XSS attack: the attacker will target a web application with XSS
vulnerability and inject malicious code and store it on the web application server that
will cause damages to the web application or compromising the users data who access
it usually the main target of this attack are blogs, forums or profiles.
Reflected or Non-persistent XSS attack: the attacker in this case wont store the
malicious code on the web application server but instead will interact with the web
application users by either sending malicious links to the victims using email, or em-
bedding the link in a web page residing on another server so after clicking on the
malicious link the attack will be sent to the victim’s browser and the harm will be
effected.
DOM-based XSS attack: in this attack the effected part is the DOM environment
which the attacker will modify it to preform unwanted/unexpected actions at the
client side while the page is not modified [70]
XSS attacks are still difficult to address. There are ways to minimize the XSS at-
tacks. By encoding and increasing the inputs validation level, it is possible to mini-
mize the attacks [70].
Nevertheless, many approaches to prevent and detect XSS attacks has been pro-
posed with different techniques either Implemented on client side or server side or
hybrid technique which are done in combination of client and server side [71]. Inter-
ested readers are referred to [72] and [69] for further detail.
5.3.4 Solutions
The solution deals with Cross-site scripting (XSS) attack by two procedures to make
sure that the attack is tackled in both client and server side. The procedure OnForm-
SubmissionInClient 17 will need to be called during form submission which essen-
tially calls procedure CrossScriptingTest 16. Vulnerable syntax and SQL characters
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3: READ All Forms Data into FORMSDATA
4: REPLACE "%20" with " " in FORMSDATA
5: REPLACE "%27" with "’" in FORMSDATA
6: REPLACE "%29" with ")" in FORMSDATA
7: COMMENT: The Replacement list above can grow based on new vulnerability or
missing syntax
8: DECLARE HACKINGDATA
9: ASSIGN the list of possible hacking values in HACKINGDATA
10: HACKINGDATA[] ={"script","sysdatabase","sysobject", "char(", "varchar", "se-
lect", "alert", "\x00","\x20", "’) or ’", "’) and ’" }
11: for i=0 to LENGTH_ARRAY (FORMSDATA[]) −1 do
12: for j=0 to LENGTH_ARRAY(HACKINGDATA[])−1 do
13: if HACKINGDATA[j] EXISTS in FORMSDATA[i] then









3: if PROCEDURE CrossScriptingTest RETURNS ’possible hacking attempt’
then
4: RETURN ERROR with possible breach
5: end if
6: Call each data_type trap PROCEDURE
7: if EACH data_type trap RETURNS False then
8: RETURN ERROR with possible breach
9: end if




Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks occurs when the victim holds an active ses-
sion with a trusted site while visiting a malicious site. It creates a malicious request by
the attacker to force the victim’s web browser to perform an unwanted actions on the
trusted website without the victim’s interaction in that request by tricking the browser
to believe that these requests are actually a legitimate requests from the victim.
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FIGURE 5.3: CSRF attack [2]
XSS and CSRF are two different different form of attack. The cross-site scripting
XSS exploits the trust of a user, while the cross-site request forgery exploits the trust
of an web application.
There are two types of CSRF attacks (reflected and stored) [2].There are some lim-
itations to the CSRF attack. In order for the CSRF to succeed it depends on some
important factors, such as:
• Attacker should analyse the structure of the website and the forms included.
• Finding website that does not check referrer header is an important step in the
attack.
• The user should be in a valid session (logged in) in the web site while clicking
on the malicious link.
These factors should be true while attacking [73].
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5.4.1 Solutions
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Prevention Cheat Sheet [74] has described the pos-
sible solutions in greater detail. CSRF attacks can be resolved by disabling the previ-
ous points such as checking the referrer header and limiting the lifetime of authenti-
cation cookies. However limiting the lifetime of the authentication cookies does not
help the most data driven site because users require to login to the system more fre-
quently and that is considered to be a distracting factors for the users and business.
Interested readers are referred to [73] and [75] for more detail. In practice checking
the http Referrer and using secure cookies prevents CSRF attacks greatly.
5.4.2 Check referrer
Maintaning a white list of IP addresses or URL those can send POST data to web ap-
plications is important. In most business cases it is possible to restrict post operations
from any other server except the actual Web URL. IsValidReferrer 18 can deal with
Referrer check based on a white list of IP address or URL. According to [74], Referrer
trap should be able to handle most CSRF attacks considering those attack are done by
manipulating form and querystring from another server. So clearly the white listing
will prevent those server by referrer.
Algorithm 18 IsValidReferrer
1: procedure IsV alidReferrer
2: if REQUESTED REFERRER MATCHES WITH A WHITE LIST OF IP AD-
DRESS OR URL then
3: RETURN TRUE
4: else
5: EXIT IsValidReferrer with POSSIBLE CSRF Breach
6: end if
7:end procedure
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5.4.3 Use secure cooking
It is important to use secure cookies. This can be done both is webserver configuration
level or from application logic. I suggest of doing both. If any of these are compro-
mised, the other can be operational. Uers are referred to https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/ms228262(v=VS.80).aspx [76] for setting up secure coookies in server level.
Algorithm 19 SetValidSecureCookies
1: procedure SetV alidSecureCookies
2: Check whether the cookies is HTTP or HTTPS





This section deals with Security Misconfiguration, Unvalidated Redirects and For-
wards, No Account Lockout, Insecure Password Policy, HTTPS not enforced.
5.5.1 Security misconfiguration
[49] has got a great detail why the site becomes vulnerable due to misconfiguration.
Unpatched security flaws in the server software permits directory listing and directory
traversal attacks. Unnecessary default backup, applications, configuration files, web
pages, improper file and directory permissions,services enabled, including content
management and remote administration can make the system vulnerable to attack.
Default accounts with their default passwords, administrative or debugging functions
that are enabled or accessible, overly informative error messages (more details in the
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error handling section), misconfigured SSL certificates and encryption setting, use of
default certificates, improper authentication with external systems can cause issue.
Monitoring the operating systems, software and latest security update are essential
in the web server which eventually will give the security of the web application on
that server.
5.5.2 Unvalidated redirects and forwards
Frequent Redirects and Forwards can be dangerous. Specially the parametrized query-
string can be manipulated by hackers by changing the values. [49] suggested to avoid
redirect and forward. But in real life web solution, it is difficult to avoid query-string
in redirect and forward. So the best solution for redirection is not to trust the query-
string and validate each of them by using validation technique described in previous
section.
The SQL injection routine and XSS routine described in 5.2 and 5.3 will be useful.
The parametrized query-string issue can be resolved by dynamic URL rewriting in
server side too. That will disguise the actual query-string and will be hard for the
hackers to guess.
5.5.3 No account lockout
Account must have to be locked out after several tries. Otherwise it will lead to Brute
Force Attack[49]. Although CAPTCHA is considered to be a solution but this is not
enough. We have implemented the procedure CheckLoginAttempt 20. The value of
MaxAttempAllowed should not be higher than 5. Each time where an unsuccessful
attempt happen from the same session, a session counter will be incremented by 1.
After the maximum threshold of unsuccessful attempts, the account should be locked
out. The Brute Force Attack is very common, so this simple solution will help greatly
to remove this vulnerability from a web application.
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Algorithm 20 CheckLoginAttempt(MaxAttempAllowed)
1: procedure CHECKLOGINATTEMPT (MAXATTEMPALLOWED)
2: DECLARE a SESSION Variable LoginCount
3: Initialize Session("LoginCount") to 0 only at the first time of the session
4: EACH TIME Login attempted increment the variable by 1
5: Session("LoginCount") = Session("LoginCount") + 1
6: if Session("LoginCount")> MaxAttempAllowed then
7: return ERROR with possible breach
8: end if
9: end procedure
5.5.4 Insecure password policy
’The True Cost of Unusable Password Policies’ [77] has described in great detail why
Insecure Password Policy is unusable and vulnerable. Enforcing minimum length,
stregth, combination of uppercase, lowercase and numbers ensure a strong password.
There are algorithms and implementations in web spectrum under free license those
can be directly plugged in web application. Example websites are
http://metabetageek.com/2010/05/19/password-meter-version-2-0-now-available/
and http://www.passwordmeter.com/.
5.5.5 HTTPS not enforced
There are web applications where https is not mandatory throughout the site. The
site doest not enforce https in the content area but force https in the transactional
area. A good example is online ticketing solutions. For example you can browse
http://barbican.org.uk up until someone click on book now button. Once you click
book now button, you are automatically redirected to https. So enforcing needs to
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be done page level on that scenario so that user cannot bypass https where you want
them to be secure.
The routine HTTPRedirection 21 will automatically redirect user to https although
the user types http in the browser. This logic also needs to check whether secure
certificate is installed in the server. It is easy to check by server side syntax in web
application. This simple solution will save the application from hackers where there
are mixed type pages in the website.
Algorithm 21 HTTPRedirection
1: procedure HTTPREDIRECTION
2: if REQUESTTED_SERVER_PORT <> 443 AND HTTPS_INSTALLED_IN_THE
SERVER then





Circular pattern matching for One
to Many Fingerprint Identification
6.1 Introduction
The fingerprint identification is not a new topic but there is still a space for the en-
hancement[78]. Interesting enough, the proposed algorithm in [45] was the first at-
tempt to utilise circular string matching techniques for solving fingerprints recogni-
tions problem accurately and efficiently. The proposed algorithm was to convert the
fingerprints image into circular strings mainly to solve the rotation problem. Later, in
[79], the authors showed the high accuracy and efficiency of the algorithm by imple-
menting it and analysing the experiment results.
In this chapter I will present a new technique to reduce search space of fingerprints
by applying liner time filters on the saved fingerprints regardless of the different ro-
tations of these fingerprints in the database. Based on the user’s choice of implemen-
tations, this process may work as preprocessing step or can be embedded in real time.
I will recommend this as a preprocessing stage so that in run-time there is not much
efforts on calculating the filters.
The fingerprints in the database will be saved in a circular string format that will
be extracted using the extraction algorithm in [45]. Afterwords, four effective filters
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will be applied on the database and the result will be saved in the database row of
respective fingerprint. Before running any costly matching algorithm, the best candi-
dates from the database will be chosen by using the saved values of the filters.
6.2 Related works
When it comes to solving fingerprints identification problem with large databases,
fingerprint indexing and fingerprint classification are the most reliable solutions until
now [36]. Henry classifications system [37] classified the fingerprints into five cate-
gories: left loop, right loop, whorl, arch, and tented arch. Nevertheless, these number
of categories are relativity small comparing to the number of the fingerprints in the
databases. To explain, fingerprints indexing is to present the fingerprints with feature
vectors. This approach is deploy on matching stage where a query fingerprints will
be matched with the fingerprints in database which their vectors are similar to query
vector [36]. Various algorithms have been proposed to improve fingerprints indexing
which involve either global feature or minutiae feature. In [38] and [39] the proposed
algorithms based on features of triangle or quadrangle geometric and selected simple
hashing methods. However, these geometric characteristic have more sensitivity to
distortion and noise. whereas, [40] designed a descriptor used a minutiae triplet, their
features of triplet consists of the angles, the length of each length and the ridge to be
calculated between each minutiae pair. However, a false rate might be happening due
to that the minutia is superior in discrimination. A pairwise enrolment is used to re-
duce the false rate between each input fingerprint and the stored fingerprints in the
database using clustering transformation parameter, however, this costs a lot of time.
Later, [38] developed the algorithm in [40] to increase the matching accuracy and the
speed. They used a new minutiae triplets feature and effective ad-hoc geometric rules
on the theory of triplets matching instead of pairwise enrollment. Therefore, an log-
arithm has been proposed in [41] to use a binary Minutia Cylinder Code (MCC) to
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be a minutia descriptor. This approach is proposed to encode the direction and lo-
cation of neighbour minutiae around per minutia into a bit vector with fixed length.
Although, MCC has higher accuracy and speed but it requires a higher dimension. Al-
ternatively, Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) is utilised to search for MCC hypothesis
correspondences rather than original quantisation strategy.However,it is not efficient
for applications need high accuracy.
6.3 Problem definition
For a given fingerprint, I am given circular strings which is extracted from [45] and
this needs to be identified in a large database. The given strings are essentially circular
strings with binary alphabet. Here I consider the problem of finding occurrences of a
pattern string P of length m with circular structure in a text string T of length n with
linear structure and circular structures are binary strings. For instance, to find out the
binary sequence of a circular structure, it must locate all positions in T where at least
one rotation of P occurs. I also consider the given solutions on [45] for one to one
fingerprint identification. Identifying the given fingerprint in a large database is the
problem I have chosen to address.
6.4 Contribution
In this chapter I extended my work on circular pattern matching to identify fingerprint
in a large database. My focus here is to reduce the search space by using effective
filters those I explained in detail in Chapter 2 and Chapter3.
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6.5 Preliminaries
I explained Circular pattern matching in great detail in previous chapters. I am just
providing the basics here in fingerprint perspective where I need to use binary alpha-
bet instead of genomic alphabet because the given circular strings consist of binary
alphabet {0, 1}.
A circular string of length m can be viewed as a traditional linear string which has
the left-most and right-most symbols wrapped around and stuck together in some
way. Under this notion, the same circular string can be seen as m different linear
strings, which would all be considered equivalent. Given a string P of length m, I
denote by P i = P[i : m]P[1 : i− 1], 0 < i < m, the i-th rotation of P and P0 = P .
I consider the binary alphabet, i.e., Σ = {0, 1}. In my approach, each character
of the alphabet is presented by its numeric value. I use num(x), x ∈ Σ to denote the
numeric value of the character x. So, I have num(0) = 0, num(1) = 1. For a string
S, I use the notation SN to denote the numeric representation of the string S; and
SN [i] denotes the numeric value of the character S[i]. So, if S[i] = 1 then SN [i] =
num(1) = 1. The concept of circular string and their rotations also apply naturally on
their numeric representations as is illustrated in Example below.
6.5.1 Example
Suppose I have a pattern P = 0110101. The numeric representation of P is PN =
0110101. And this numeric representation has the following rotations: P1N = 1101010,
P2N = 1010101, P3N = 0101011, P4N = 1010110, P5N = 0101101, P6N = 1011010, P7N =
0110101.
The problem I handle in this chapter can be formally defined as follows.
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6.5.2 Problem
(Approximate Circular Pattern Matching with k-mismatches (ACPM)). Given a pat-
tern P of length m, a text T of length n > m, and an integer threshold k < m, find
all factors F of T such that F ≡k P i for some 0 ≤ i < m. And when I have a factor
F = T [j : j+ |F|− 1] such that F ≡k P i I say that the circular pattern C(P) k-matches
T at position j. I also say that this k-match is due to P i, i.e., the ith rotation of P .
In this chapter I have solved one to many fingerprint problem by adapting my
work [80] on circular pattern matching. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 provide the detail
explanation.
6.6 Filtering Algorithm
As it has been mentioned above, the algorithm is based on some filtering techniques.
Suppose I am given a pattern P and a text T . I will frequently and conveniently
use the expression “C(P) k-matches T at position i" (or equivalently, “P circularly k-
matches T at position i") to indicate that one of the conjugates of P k-matches T at
position i (or equivalently, C(P) ≡k T ).
6.6.1 Database filters
I employ a total of four filters. The key to the observations and the resulting filters is
the fact that each function I devise results in an output when applied to the rotations
of a circular string. I adapt 4 filters below based on binary alphabet {0, 1}.
6.6.2 Filter 1
I define the function sum on a string P of length m as follows: sum(P) =∑mi=1 PN [i].
The first filter, Filter 1, is based on this sum function. I have the following observation.
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Observation 1 Consider a circular string P and a linear string T both having length n. If
C(P) ≡k T , where 0 ≤ k < n, then we must have
sum(T )− k × 1 + k × 0 ≤ sum(C(P)) ≤ sum(T ) + k × 1− k × 0.
6.6.3 Filter 2
Observation 2 Consider a circular string P and a linear string T both having length n and
assume that A = ext(P) and B = ext(T ). If C(P) ≡k T , where 0 ≤ k < n, then I must
have
abs_total_distance(B)− k × 1 + k × 0 ≤ abs_total_distance(C(A))
≤ abs_total_distance(B) + k × 1− k × 0.
6.6.4 Filter 3
Now I present the following related observation which is the basis of the Filter 3. Note
that Observation 2 differs with Observation 3 only through using the absolute version
of the function used in the latter.
Observation 3 Consider a circular string P and a linear string T both having length n and
assume that A = ext(P) and B = ext(T ). If C(P) ≡k T , where 0 ≤ k < n, then I must
have
total_distance(B)− k × 1 + k × 0 ≤ total_distance(C(A))
≤ total_distance(B) + k × 1− k × 0.
6.6.5 Filter 4
Filter 4 uses the sum() function used by Filter 1, albeit, in a slightly different way. In
particular, it applies the sum() function on individual characters. So, for x ∈ Σ I define
sumx(P) =
∑
1≤i≤|P|,P[i]=x PN [i]. Now I have the following observation.
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Observation 4 Consider a circular string P and a linear string T both having length n. If
C(P) ≡k T , where 0 ≤ k < n, then I must have
sumx(T )− k × num(x) ≤ sumx(C(P)) ≤ sumx(T ) + k × num(x)
for all x ∈ Σ.
For clarity, the 4 filters are illustrated in the below with the example in terms of
binary alphabet. For the detail illustrations of the filters including example and ex-
planations, please refer to Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 where explanations are given on
genomic letters perspective.
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FIGURE 6.1: Filters by binary alphabet
Chapter 7
URL String Search in
Steganography - Algorithm and
Web Tools
7.1 Introduction
Steganography is the science of hiding data within data. I have provided background
information on this topic in Chapter 1. In this Chapter, I propose a novel detection
approach that concentrates on detecting hidden URLs in the loss-less images and ex-
tracting them from images. My approach uses the manipulations of Least Significant
Bits [58] of the images which are imperceptible to human eyes.
7.2 Problem definition
The problem is to detect an URL hidden inside an image. As described in Chapter
1, any malicious code can be embedded by using least significant bit(s). Modifying
LSB means modifying the colour by using least significant bits of an image. There
are different type of colour formats such as 8 bits, 24 bits etc. They have both colour
and grey scale. 8 bits colour means each pixel can have any of 256 (28) colour. The
same calculation is applicable 8 bits grey scale or 24 bit colours. So modifying the
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least significant bit in an array of huge combination of colours does not make much
difference in human eye. This makes the use of LSB URL attack.
For example, an url http://exampleattack.com has 24 characters. Each character
of this url takes 8 bits in ASCII format. The URL thus requires 192 bits from an image
to encode.
For the simplicity of example, let us see how first character ’h’ of our example url
http://exampleattack.com can be added by using least significant bits of an image.
The ASCII value for ’h’ is decimal 104 and binary 01101000.
Before LSB insertion let us assmume that 8 consecutive bytes of an images is below.
10000010 10100110 11110101 10110101 10110011 10010111 10000100 10110001
After inserting ’h’ (01101000) in least significant bits the result is below.
10000010 10100111 11110101 10110100 10110011 10010110 10000100 10110000
In this way by using more significant bit of images we can embed the rest of the
characters of the intended URL.
7.3 Contribution
I have dealt with hidden URL detection in the image and explained the approach as
well as provided with the algorithm and Pseudocode. The algorithm has also been
implemented. Furthermore, the URL detection problem in an image has been simpli-
fied with respect to string matching approach which can be adapted in other kind of
string matching problems in an image. For example, users may be interested to search
for malicious commands or other kind of strings hidden in the image using least sig-
nificant bits (LSB) of the image. In this chapter, I have implemented this algorithm
and successfully tested and compared various results using different images.
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7.4 URL detection algorithm
I am going to present an Algorithm overview in 7.4.1 and detail Psuedocode in 7.4.2 to
detect a hidden URL from the least significant bits of an image. The detail complexity
analyses is done in 7.4.3
AAA AARP ABB ABBOTT ABOGADO
AC ACADEMY ACCENTURE ACCOUNTANT ACCOUNTANTS
ACO ACTIVE ACTOR AD ADS
ADULT AE AEG AERO AF
AFL AG AGENCY AI AIG
AIRFORCE AIRTEL AL ALLFINANZ ALSACE
AM AMICA AMSTERDAM ANALYTICS ANDROID
AO APARTMENTS APP APPLE AQ
AQUARELLE AR ARAMCO ARCHI ARMY
ARPA ARTE AS ASIA ASSOCIATES
AT ATTORNEY AU AUCTION AUDI
AUDIO AUTHOR AUTO AUTOS AW
AX AXA AZ AZURE ..etc
TABLE 7.1: List of Top-Level Domains by the ICANN - for full list
please refer to [5]
7.4.1 Algorithm overview
Step 1: Create a sorted list, DOMAIN[], from the static official top level domain list.
Step 2: Create an array called BITMAP[], from an image taking each bit in array.
Step 3: Make a character array called, LSBCHARARRAY[] from an Intermediate
array of LSBARRAY[] by converting each 8 bits to an ASCII character.
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Step 4: Loop throuth the LSBCHARARRAY[], find out possible hidden url forming
by http or https, www, domain name and top level domain(TLD).
7.4.2 The algorithm in Pseodocode
The 4 steps given in 5.1 are presented here with detail pseudocode so that users can
convert any any programming language easily with little efforts.
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1: procedure FindURLInImage
2: CREATE a sorted indexed array DOMAIN[] from the official top level domain
list
3: CREATE a BITMAP[] array from the image taking each bit
4: *Comment: Loop through the BITMAP[] and create an array LSBARRAY[]
with the least significant bits
5: Integer i, j
6: i=0
7: j=0
8: for i = 0 to BITMAP[] do
9: if (i != 0) AND (i+1) MOD 8 = 0 then
10: return LSBARRAY[j++] = BITMAP[i]
11: end if
12: end for





17: for i = 0 to LSBARRAY[] do t = STRING((t) + LSBARRAY[i])
18: if (i!=0) and (i+1) MOD 8 = 0 then
19: return LSBCHARARRAY[j++] = ConvertToCharacter(t)
20: t = ""
21: end if
22: end for
23: *Comment: Loop through the LSBCHARARRAY[] to detect URL by using the
DOMAIN[] array Integer temp, l,s






30: String URL = ""
31: String OutPutURLArray[]
32: for i=0 to LSBCHARARRAY[] do
33: ’ Initializeat start of loop
34: httpOrHttpsExists = False
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35: wwwExists = False
36: urlFound = False
37: URL = ""
38: J=0
39: t=""
40: temp = 0
41: if LSBCHARARRAY[i] = ":" then
42: *Comment:Check Possibility of having an http:\\
43: t = ConvertToString(LSBCHARARRAY[i-4] to LSBCHARARRAY[i+2])
44: if LowerCase(t) = "http:\\" then
45: httpOrHttpsExists = True
46: temp = i + 3
47: URL= "http:\\"
48: end if
49: t = ""
50: if httpOrHttpsExists = False then
51: *Comment:Possibility of having an https:\\
52: t = ConvertToString(LSBCHARARRAY[i-5] to LSBCHARAR-
RAY[i+2])
53: if LowerCase(t) = "https:
54: " then
55: httpOrHttpsExists = True




60: t = ""
61: t = ConvertToString(LSBCHARARRAY[i+3] to LSBCHARARRAY[i+6])
62: if LowerCase(t) = "www." then
63: temp = temp+ i + 5




68: if httpOrHttpsExists = False Or wwwExists = False) AND LSBCHARAR-
RAY[i] = "." then
69: *Comment: Check for . to find www because at this point we know that
http or www trap inside the condition for ":" failed.
70: t = ""
71: t = ConvertToString(LSBCHARARRAY[i-3] to LSBCHARARRAY[i])
72: if LowerCase(t) = "www." then
73: *Comment: jump the i to the new position and save in a temmorary
variable
74: temp = i + 5




79: if httpOrHttpsExists = True Or wwwExists = True then
80: *Comment: Assign the position of i to find the URL
81: i = temp
82: t = ""
83: ’At his point the existence of http of www is found. Now look for the
rest of the url
84: for j = i to LSBCHARARRAY[] do
85: if LSBCHARARRAY[j] = "." then
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Algorithm 22 Procedure FindURLInImage
86: URL = Concat(URL, ConvertToString(LSBCHARARRAY[j-i+1]
to LSBCHARARRAY[j]))
87: i = j + 1




92: if urlFound then
93: urlFound = False
94: for j = i to LSBCHARARRAY[] do
95: t = Concat(t,LSBCHARARRAY[j])
96: *Comment: Now check t in sorted top level domain list DO-
MAIN
97: if t EXISTS in DOMAIN[] then
98: URL = Concat(URL, ConvertToString(LSBCHARARRAY[j-
i+1] to LSBCHARARRAY[j]))
99: urlFound = True
100: *Comment: Reinitialize the value of i for the next iteration






107: if urlFound then
108: *Comment: It is possible to have multiple URL in different position
109: OutPutURLArray[s] = URL
110: s = s + 1
111: end if
112: end for
113: if s > 0 THEN then
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7.4.3 Complexity analyses
Step 1: Create a sorted list from the static official top level domain
Space complexity: I have a known TLD list [5]. So in the preprocessing stage, I
create an indexed array, DOMIAN[] considering each TLD as a string. Space com-
plexity is linear to the size of all characters plus the index of each string position in
a sorted order. Also I create a separate index list with just starting position of TLDs
with a specific character. For example, .co and .com both start with c, so if we know
where the c starts in the whole sorted list, we just can look in the block starting with
’c’. The overall space complexity for the sorted list is O(M) +O(t) + O(i) where M is
the total number of characters, t is the index on each TLD string which is limited to
the official static list.
Time complexity: This step of computation is part of preprocessing, so complexity
is not a major issue. However it is possible to build up sorted list by radix sort [81]
where an LSD radix sort operates in O(nk) in all cases, where n is the number of keys,
and k is the average key length.
Step 2: Create a sorted list from the static official top level domain list
Space complexity: O(M) where M is the number of bits.
Time complexity: O(n) where n is the number of bits. This means in just single
iteration the array is built.
Step 3 : Make a character array by converting each 8 bits to an ASCII character
Space complexity: The complexity is O(n) here where n=M/8 where M is the
number of bits in BitMap and only one in each 8 bits are placed in character array
by converting 8 such Least Significant bits into character. So the complexity here is
sub linear. Although an intermediate LSBARRAY has been introduced in Step 3 for
clarity purpose of the flow, it is possible to calculate the LSBCHARARRAY directly
from BITMAP[] array. So LSBARRAY[] is not required in the implementation.
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Time complexity. This is looping through the BitMap array just once and pro-
ducing character array by taking each 8 significant bits together and converting to
ASCII. So the time complexity is linear here with O(n) where looping n bits just once
produces the result. Converting to ASCII and character happens just 1 in 64 where 1
byte( 8 consecutive LSB) comes from 64 bits. This operation produces time complexity
of O(n+n/64) which is linear.
Step 4: Loop throuth the array, find out possible hidden url forming by http or
https, www, domain name and top level domain(TLD)
Space complexity: The space complexity holds the linerity here with O(n) where
n is the number of characters in the array.
Time complexity: This is a loop through the characters array. Finding first 3 parts
of an URL (http/https and/or www, domaion name) are done in one go in the single
loop. There are inside loops used to find the position and calculation purpose for
http, https and www. The actual counter of characters array is incremented in each go
whether it is inner loop or outer loop. The complexity holds linear for the operations
because the whole characters array are traversed just once. Looking up the 4th part,
Top Level Domain (TLD) requires a short look up in a sorted array described in Step
1. For the whole character array, this look up is just done to complete the search in a
sorted and indexed Top Level Domain array which I called in step 1 as DOMAIN[].
In a sorted list, the binary search works as log(n) complexity in worst case where n is
the number of items in an array. But in our case, n is narrowed down by index of each
character. So the each block of searched area is n/m where m is the number characters
in alphabet. So the search takes log(n/m)time because we know the starting character
what to look up DOMAIN[] array. The overall complexity stays linear for step 4.
Chapter 7. URL String Search in Steganography - Algorithm and Web Tools 108
7.5 Experiments
I implemented this algorithm using Visual Studio 2015 Studio, ASP.Net 4.5 and Javascript.
The solution is available on http://tanvera-001-site1.htempurl.com and the source
code can be downloaded from http://www.samirsoftware.com/stegano.zip. The pro-
gram source code link is available at 9 too. I have tested the solution using bmp and
png images of different sizes, colour depth, colour palettes and compression types.
The solution has been tested using IE11, Firefox 4 and Chrome Ver 50.0 . The solution
needs to access files from client machines or folders, so if there are restrictions on ac-
cessing images files, the browser will not be able to read the images files. The URL
in the experiments is restricted to the top level domain name. As it is the objective to
keep the output image identical to the original image from the viewers prospective,
the solution can only accept certain types of images as input. It cannot accept com-
pressed and lossy images as there is a possibility that the URL data will be lost when
the images are compressed and we will not be able to extract the URL from the stego
image [57]. For monochrome images changing the LSB might alter the image in such
a way that the changes are visible to the viewers and raise suspicion that the image
have been altered.
FIGURE 7.1: Extracting URL from image
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Extracting URL Images: The users needs to select the image using the “Browse”
button , which will open a file selector window. The user needs to select a bmp, gif or
png image. Once the image file is selected then the user needs to click “Extract URL”
button. The website will then upload the image in the server, extract the bitmap of the
image and apply the algorithm. If it identifies the URL then it will display the output
on the screen 7.1. If an URL is not present, then an appropriate message is displayed.
FIGURE 7.2: Hidding URL using stego process
Hiding URL Images: The user need to select the image where they want to hide
the URL using the “Browse” button, which will open a file selector window. The
user needs to select a bmp, gif or png image. Once the image file is selected then the
URL needs to be entered in the given text box. The user needs to click “Hide URL”
button. The system will first verify the URL is a valid URL , otherwise it will display
an error message. The website will then upload the image in the server, extract the
bitmap of the image and hide the URL inside the image. The modified image will be
then displayed on the browser 7.2. The user can right click on the image and save the
image in a desired location.
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7.5.1 Checking experiment results
7.5.2 Image difference
I tested the generated images with the original using a free Image comparison website
[82]. The website found no difference between the original and image containing the
hidden URL 7.3. It compares the pixel value and colour between the images , there is
a threshold (3 points) which the pixel must exceed in order to register as a difference.
FIGURE 7.3: Image difference
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7.5.3 Histograms analysis
I have analyzed the histograms of the image and the generated stego image. There
was no difference between the histograms of both these original image 7.4 and the
stego image 7.5.
FIGURE 7.4: Histograms Analysis
FIGURE 7.5: Histograms analysis in stego image
Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1 Contribution and future direction
I have developed efficient algorithms and implemented web based tool on circular
pattern matching. I have applied circular pattern matching algorithms to solve One to
Many fingerprint problems. Web based tools attracts the inherent web vulnerabilities,
those I have addressed by providing the solutions in both algorithmic and practical
perspective. I have done further work by providing algorithm and implementations
on web security in Steganography perspective.
In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I have employed effective lightweight filtering tech-
nique to reduce the search space of the Circular Pattern Matching (CPM) problem.
I have conducted experiments to show the effectiveness of the resulting algorithm
based on the filters for both exact and approximate Circular Pattern Matching prob-
lem. I compared the results with the state of the art algorithms and showed the ef-
fectiveness of my filters and algorithms. I have presented that the elapsed time of my
algorithms are much smaller than the state of the art algorithm[4] for the filtered text
string. I have presented SimpLiFiACPM, an extremely fast algorithm based on the
filters for approximate circular pattern matching. Much of the speed of this algorithm
comes from the fact that the filters are effective but extremely simple and lightweight.
The most intriguing feature of SimpLiFiACPM is perhaps its capability to plug in any
algorithm to solve ACPM and take advantage of it. My algorithm turns out to be
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much faster in practice because of the huge reduction in the search space through fil-
tering. In Chapter 6, I have provided a uses cases for Circular Pattern Matching to
solve One to Many fingerprints identification problem. The presented approach em-
phasised on reducing the search space of the circular pattern matching problem by
deploying effective lightweight filtering technique in a linear time.
The future researcher can find out more application areas of Circular Pattern Match-
ing and solve those in practical perspective by using the algorithms proposed in this
thesis.
In Chapter 4 I developed a fast and efficient browser based tool based on the al-
gorithms provided in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. To my knowledge while this thesis is
underway, this is the first web based Circular Pattern Matching tool that operates in
client side. I have conducted a good amount of experiments in Chapter 2 and Chap-
ter 3, that gives an excellent academic framework of this work which leads to the
development of web based practical tool on Circular Pattern Matching. Also the se-
lection of technology, design patterns and the approach of development comprised a
professional standard so that this tool can set an example in terms of methodology
of developing similar kind of software in academic arena. The users do not need to
install any software or do not need to upload the big file in the server. My develop-
ment approach works with big data in client side by using lower memory working
as chunk by chunk without uploading any data to web server. Instead of program
running in the web server, the java script code, is transported in the browser in run-
time and does the computation. Inherently any upload over http is slow. Also in
server side, various factors such as LAN speed, server’s concurrent users, speed on
various hops over Internet up to server, influence the upload of big file. For example,
Blast (http://blast.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Blast.cgi) is a great tool for bioinformaticians but
I have a scenario where I need to upload both query and reference files to the server,
then it is very difficult for big file to upload over http to Blast. I have been able to up-
load the highest 600MB from both my home and college infrastructure to blast after
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several tries. In most cases it resulted by losing connection session with server or by
crashing browser while uploading big data. So I developed my tool by using client
side programming language so that it does not fall in the upload trap over http. Many
sites open a dedicated FTP support for the users so that big data can be uploaded.
But that means the computation does not happen in real time and manual procedure
is needed to complete the operations. It is understandable that for many other appli-
cations, a huge server side resource is necessary, but surely those application should
provide different architecture such as socket or ftp, rather than http. My main aim is
to produce result for big chunk of data in the browser with possible minimum waiting
time for the user. I computed my CPM algorithm on 3 GB data at ease but it can easily
work with large data because the memory does not load the data at a time. It works
chunk by chunk.
There is an interesting area on this tools where the future works can be done. When
a client program needs huge computational resource such as a big server’s computa-
tional power, then a new approach will have to be taken to resolve the issue. A clever
program needs to be written by AJAX so that only necessary data is transferred in
runtime and computation is done in combination of client and server machine.
In Chapter 5, I presented guidelines and solutions for web vulnerabilities. The
proposed solutions are described in separate sections in an algorithmic manner. The
solutions came across by learning the reasons of vulnerability[47] and penetration
technique used by the scanning tools [48] to exploit the vulnerability. The vulnerabil-
ity details have been described briefly to cover the basics of common vulnerabilities. I
have given detail description of the solutions. A very brief overview of each problem
and the solutions with the best practices as well as PSEUDO-CODE has been provided
in this thesis. The relevant example codes with vbscript and Javascript has been up-
loaded in the url [65]. The Javascript code I have provided can be plugged directly in
web application at the client side because Javascript is de facto standard of browser
based client side language.
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Web security is an area where constant improvement of the techniques is needed.
The future researcher can look at the guidelines and solutions given in this thesis
on web vulnerabilities. They can work on improving the solution in light of new
vulnerabilities and threats.
In Chapter 5,I have dealt with hidden URL detection in the image and explained
the approach as well as provided with the algorithm and Pseudocode. The algorithm
has also been implemented. Furthermore, the URL detection problem in an image has
been simplified with respect to string matching approach which can be adapted in
other kind of string matching problem in an image. For example, users may be inter-
ested to search for malicious commands or other kind of strings hidden in the image
using least significant bits (LSB) of the image. In this chapter, I have implemented
this algorithm and successfully tested and compared various results using different
images.
In a nutshell, this thesis provided efficient algorithms and implementation on few
areas of applications. This thesis provided a professional standard web based tool
along with the detail on web tool vulnerabilities as well as security. In the web tool,
a state of the art client side technique has been used which is first in nature on Circu-
lar Pattern Matching problem while this thesis is underway. In general the ideas can
be used by future researcher to devise efficient algorithms and techniques. The pro-
gramming codes and technique used in this thesis can be used by future researchers
to solve their use cases.
Chapter 9
Appendix
9.1 Circular pattern matching
The program source code for Circular pattern matching is available at
http://www.samirsoftware.com/CPM.zip
9.2 Approximate circular pattern matching
The program source code for Approximate circular pattern matching is available at
http://www.samirsoftware.com/ACPM.zip
9.3 Web tool for approximate circular pattern matching
The program source code of Web tool for Approximate Circular Pattern Matching is
available at http://www.samirsoftware.com/tool.zip
9.4 Web security
The web security guidance source code is available at
http://www.samirsoftware.com/code.pdf
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9.5 Steganography
The program source code for Steganography tool is available at
http://www.samirsoftware.com/stegano.zip
9.6 ACPM result analysis
Timing for 720 permutations of 6 filters are available at
http://www.samirsoftware.com/resultAnalysis.xlsx
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